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CONTRACT, PRIORITY, AND ODIOUS DEBT'
ADAM FEIBELMAN**
This Article proposes that sovereign nations and their creditors
adopt a contractual approach to the seemingly intractable problem
of odious debt. Odious debt is generally defined as an obligation
incurred by a despotic or illegitimate leader that provides no value
to the population of the sovereign. In recent years, spurred
primarily by the financial problems of post-Hussein Iraq, many
writers and commentators have proposed doctrinal and institutional
mechanisms that would provide odious debt relief. These proposals
all face practical challenges, and they would likely involve
significant risk of destabilizing financial markets. Under a
contractual approach, a majority or supermajority of a sovereign's
creditors would have the power to identify odious obligations of the
sovereign. The sovereign would then be obligated to repudiate
these debts. Creditors should have good incentives to employ this
arrangement discriminately. More than any other relevant actors,
creditors will internalize the costs and benefits of odious debt relief.
Even if the private benefits of contractual odious debt arrangements
are modest, they might create significant positive externalities. If so,
academics, official actors, and policy advocates should encourage
sovereigns and their creditors to adopt such arrangements.
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INTRODUCTION
This Article proposes that sovereign nations and their creditors
adopt a contractual approach to the seemingly intractable problem of
odious debt. Generally speaking, "odious debt" is an obligation
incurred in the name of a sovereign nation by a despotic or
illegitimate government, the proceeds of which only enrich the despot
or fund the repression of his or her subjects. Most writers on the
topic agree that such obligations violate principles of justice or reduce
social welfare or both; citizens of a sovereign debtor should, ideally,
not be bound to repay odious debt incurred by their leaders.' Despite
1. There is a sizeable and growing body of scholarship on the topic of odious debt,
including Omri Ben-Shahar & Mitu Gulati, Partially Odious Debts? A Framework for an
Optimal Liability Regime, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. (forthcoming 2007) (on file with the
North Carolina Law Review); Patrick Bolton & David Skeel, Odious Debts or Odious
Regimes?, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. (forthcoming 2007) (on file with the North Carolina
Law Review); Lee C. Buchheit et al., The Dilemma of Odious Debts, 56 DUKE L.J.
(forthcoming 2007) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review); Anupam Chander,
Odious Securitization, 53 EMORY L.J. 923 (2004); Anna Gelpern, Odious, Not Debt, LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. (forthcoming 2007) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review)
[hereinafter Gelpern, Odious, Not Debt]; Anna Gelpern, What Iraq and Argentina Might
Learn from Each Other, 6 CHI. J. INT'L L. 391 (2005) [hereinafter Gelpern, Iraq and
Argentina]; Michael Kremer & Seema Jayachandran, Odious Debt, 96 AM. ECON. REV. 82
(2006); Christoph G. Paulus, "Odious Debts" vs. Debt Trap: A Realistic Help?, 31 BROOK.
J. INT'L L. 83 (2005); Jedediah Purdy & Kimberly Fielding, Sovereigns, Trustees,
Guardians: Private-Law Concepts and the Limits of Legitimate State Power, LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. (forthcoming 2007) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review);
Paul B. Stephan, The Institutionalist Implications of an Odious Debt Doctrine, LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. (forthcoming 2007) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review);
Raghuram Rajan, Odious or Just Malodorous?, FIN. & DEV., Dec. 2004, at 54; Joseph
Stiglitz, Odious Rulers, Odious Debts, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Nov. 2003, at 39; James
Feinerman, Odious Debts: Old and New (Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr. Working Paper,
2004); Ashfaq Khalfan, Jeff King & Bryan Thomas, Advancing the Odious Debt Doctrine
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this wide agreement, however, sovereigns generally do not repudiate
obligations on the ground that the debt is odious or that it is
otherwise inequitable.2 This is true despite the fact that sovereigns
have the ability to thwart enforcement of their obligations if they
choose; creditors have no reliable way to reach a sovereign's assets
without the sovereign's cooperation.3 The conventional explanation
for this behavior is that sovereigns are restrained from doing so by
fear that they will suffer reputational harm or fear that they will be
penalized by other countries and international institutions.4
The recent transition of regimes in Iraq has unleashed a wave of
interest in the possibility of repudiating sovereign debt on equitable
grounds. In the wake of the recent war, a variety of commentators,
scholars, and policymakers proposed that the new Iraqi regime should
repudiate as odious some or all of the debts it inherited from Saddam
Hussein's regime.5 As explained in Part I below, some of these
individuals and organizations argued that international law recognizes
a doctrine of odious debt.6 Such a doctrine would provide a defense if
a sovereign's creditors attempt to enforce debts that did not provide a
benefit to the sovereign's citizens and that were incurred without the
citizens' consent. It is not clear, however, whether such a doctrine is
in fact part of international law. Furthermore, if it is a viable doctrine
in any context, there is serious doubt as to whether it applies in cases
of government succession. Given the frailty of this "traditional"
odious debt doctrine,7 various commentators have proposed doctrinal
and institutional alternatives.' For example, some writers have
suggested that sovereigns might challenge enforcement of their
obligations in domestic courts pursuant to domestic legal doctrines
drawn from private law and corporate law.
Yet another strand of recent commentary and scholarship has
considered alternative institutional mechanisms that would enable
(Ctr. for Int'l Sustainable Dev. Law, Working Paper No. COM/RES/ESJ, 2003), available
at http://www.cisdl.org/pdf/debtentire.pdf; Patricia Adams, Iraq's Odious Debts (Cato Inst.
Policy Analysis, No. 526, 2004), available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa526.pdf.
2. See infra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
3. See infra note 94 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
5. See infra note 21 and accompanying text.
6. See infra Part I.A. Claims that such a doctrine exists apparently originated in 1927
with the work of Alexander N. Sack. See Alexander N. Sack, Les Effets des
Transformations des Etat sur Leurs Dettes Publiques et Autres Obligations Financieres,
translated in PATRICIA ADAMS, ODIOUS DEBTS: LOOSE LENDING, CORRUPTION, AND
THE THIRD WORLD'S ENVIRONMENTAL LEGACY 164 (1991).
7. See infra Part I.A.
8. See infra Part I.B.
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sovereigns to repudiate odious obligations. For example, a vocal
group of writers and advocates proposed creating a tribunal that
would have resolved odious debt claims against Iraq's creditors.'
They proposed that the tribunal be modeled on the U.S.-Iran tribunal
and that it employ the doctrine of odious debt noted above. 0 This
proposal may now be moot with respect to Iraq, but it provides a
general model for a potential odious debt mechanism. Perhaps most
ambitiously, Michael Kremer and Seema Jayachandran have
proposed an odious debt tribunal or institution that would identify
and designate odious regimes, as opposed to odious debts, and do so
ex ante.11 Initially, they proposed that the primary aim of such an
institution would be to impose loan embargoes on regimes designated
as odious; in a subsequent paper, they have proposed that the
institution should aim instead to severely limit lending to these
regimes."
This Article represents the first effort to propose and defend a
private, contractual approach to the odious debt problem. To adopt a
contractual odious debt mechanism, a sovereign would promise its
voluntary creditors at the contracting stage that it will not incur
odious debt and that it will repudiate or subordinate13 any of its
obligations designated as odious ex post. Incurring odious debt
would be an event of default by the sovereign. The sovereign would
9. The group, Jubilee Iraq, described itself as "a network of groups and individuals
(business people, lawyers, economists, politicians, aid workers and others) working to
ensure that the Iraqi people-emerging from decades of war, oppression and sanctions-
are not unjustly forced to pay Saddam's bills." See Jubilee Iraq, About Us,
http://www.jubileeiraq.org/aboutus.htm (last visited Feb. 18, 2007). This proposal is
discussed at length infra in notes 72-80 and accompanying text.
10. See infra note 74 and accompanying text.
11. See Kremer & Jayachandran, supra note 1, at 90. This proposal is discussed at
length infra in notes 81-88 and accompanying text.
12. See Seema Jayachandran et al., Applying the Odious Debts Doctrine While
Preserving Legitimate Lending 13 (June 2006) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the
North Carolina Law Review).
13. This agreement could provide for repudiation of odious debt or subordination of
such debt or both. Repudiation of odious debts would ensure that holders of these debts
collect nothing regardless of how other creditors are treated. Subordinating the debt in
the traditional sense would result in those creditors receiving nothing unless all non-odious
debts were paid in full. To the extent of any conflict between odious and non-odious
creditors over a claim to a debtor's assets, the non-odious creditors would prevail under
either approach. Thus, for example, in any restructuring where non-odious debts would
take a loss, and where this priority is respected, the practical effect on odious debts would
be the same-their interests would effectively be eliminated. To make the arguments of
this Article easier to state, unless otherwise clear in the text, the term "repudiation" is
used hereafter to refer to any scheme that subordinates or discharges sovereign
obligations.
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also promise each creditor that it will inform subsequent creditors of
the contractual arrangement and that it will make similar agreements
with these creditors. The parties would give a majority or
supermajority of the sovereign's creditors authority to designate
obligations as odious pursuant to a contractual definition. The
sovereign would then be obligated to repudiate debts designated as
odious by the creditors. Ideally, the contractual definition of
odiousness should be tied to the actual use of the funds obtained by
the sovereign. It should also include safe harbors designed to
promote effective monitoring by creditors.
Any strategy for discharging odious debt must be carefully
circumscribed to assure future lenders that sovereign debtors will not
arbitrarily repudiate their obligations. A successful mechanism must
distinguish, as clearly and predictably as possible, between debt that
the sovereign is expected to repay and odious debt subject to
repudiation. If the standard for odiousness is relatively clear and
enforcement is predictable, creditors will be able to anticipate the risk
of repudiation or subordination on that ground. It will effectively
segment the market for sovereign debt, creating a kind of priority
scheme, giving priority to non-odious debt.14 Sovereigns that want to
raise funds for legitimate purposes should then be able to incur non-
odious debt at lower rates compared to potentially odious debt.
Increasing the cost of borrowing potentially odious debt should
reduce the amount of odious debt incurred by sovereigns. If the
markets for odious and non-odious debt can be segmented in this
way, it may enable sovereigns to repudiate odious debt and avoid
being punished by market actors or the official sector.
A contractual odious debt arrangement is more likely than other
mechanisms to enable repudiation of odious debt while maintaining
the stability of the market for sovereign debt. 5 As explained in Part
III, there are good reasons to allocate to creditors at least part of the
authority to define odious debt, identify particular debts that meet
the definition, and enforce the repudiation of those debts. More than
any other actors, creditors will internalize the costs and benefits of
any odious debt mechanism. They benefit most clearly when their
sovereign debtors avoid incurring or repudiate obligations that would
14. If odious debt is subordinated to non-odious debt, then there is priority between
the two in the conventional sense. If odious debt can be repudiated or discharged, then
non-odious debt still has priority, though in a less conventional sense. In the broadest
terms, priority is created by any factor that systematically changes the likelihood of
repayment relative to other obligations.
15. See infra Parts III.B-C.
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reduce the value of their own claims. Yet, they will bear direct costs
of the mechanism because of the chance that it will be employed
against them. They will also bear costs of the mechanism if it
destabilizes financial markets or causes other creditors to significantly
reduce the credit available to sovereigns in general. If the benefits of
the mechanism outweigh these costs, creditors should have an
incentive to adopt the scheme.
Sovereign debtors should also have incentives to adopt such a
contractual odious debt mechanism. They will benefit from the
arrangement because it will make it easier for them to obtain ex post
relief from some odious debt. More important, however, it may
benefit sovereigns by reducing the cost to them of incurring debt that
is clearly not odious. If it makes it easier for sovereigns to credibly
commit to borrowing for legitimate purposes, this should reduce their
overall cost of borrowing. It follows that the mechanism will
probably be most useful for relatively responsible regimes. Bad
regimes will almost certainly not contract into the scheme. Still, the
availability of an effective contractual mechanism may help countries
that overthrow these bad regimes by making it easier for them to
repudiate debts incurred by the bad regime and avoid at least some of
the negative results of doing so.
To be sure, such a contractual scheme would face significant
practical obstacles, especially the logistical challenges of coordinating
the mechanism itself. 6 Yet, as other writers have noted in other
contexts, a single debtor can coordinate a broad contractual
arrangement with its various creditors. 7 A private, contractual
odious debt mechanism requires coordination around only one
particular issue: whether certain debts incurred by a common
sovereign debtor should be repudiated as odious. The fact that
market actors may be hesitant to adopt the scheme in the first place
presents another obstacle. But market participants, nudged by some
official-sector institutions, have increasingly embraced creditor
coordination as a potential means to restructure sovereign debt
instruments. 8 This development may have helped make market
participants more receptive to other contract-based developments. 9
16. See infra notes 102-05, 116-18 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 129-30 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 119-26 and accompanying text.
19. See generally Anna Gelpern & Mitu Gulati, The Political Economy of Altering
Standard Form Contracts: A Case Study, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. (forthcoming June 2007)
(manuscript at 5, on file with the North Carolina Law Review) (noting that "the apparent
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Furthermore, market participants may be increasingly motivated to
contract with respect to odious debt as policymakers, advocates, and
sovereigns continue to debate employing other, more disruptive
approaches. It is worth noting that a contractual odious debt
mechanism is not necessarily exclusive of alternative approaches.
Finally, if market participants are hesitant to adopt this contractual
innovation, the official sector may want to prod them to do so if the
contractual scheme would create significant positive externalities.
I. THE PROBLEM AND RECENT PROPOSALS
Events in the wake of the Iraq war have drawn much attention to
the question of whether and when sovereigns should be able to
repudiate their debts. Saddam Hussein's regime left its successor
with approximately $125 billion to $150 billion in external debt.z°
Hussein apparently used much of the proceeds of this debt for his
personal benefit or to finance the repression of Iraqi citizens. After
his regime fell, these citizens remained indebted for the obligations he
incurred. Furthermore, the weight of these Hussein-era debts made it
difficult for a new Iraqi regime to begin to fund the country's post-
war recovery. Various commentators-people affiliated with the
American administration, for example, and other debt relief
advocates-proposed that the new Iraqi regime should simply
disavow obligations incurred by Saddam Hussein. 2' They argued that
debts incurred by Hussein's regime were odious debts and that the
new regime should not be bound to repay them.
This was a dramatic proposal. As noted above, sovereigns
generally do not repudiate their obligations.22 While they have the
ability to thwart enforcement of their obligations if they choose, they
do not do so for fear of immediate market-based penalties or longer-
success of the CAC campaign may have created a new model where economic policy
proposals are framed in terms of private contract reform").
20. See Buchheit et al., supra note 1 (manuscript at 19); Gelpern, Iraq and Argentina,
supra note 1, at 391.
21. See Buchheit et al., supra note 1 (manuscript at 18-20) (discussing the spike in
interest in repudiating Iraqi debt after the fall of Hussein); Gelpern, Iraq and Argentina,
supra note 1, at 403 ("Some Iraqi politicians, international NGOs, and their allies (notably
including Paul Wolfowitz and Richard Perle) have argued passionately that Iraq must
repudiate its debt as illegitimate because it was incurred under Saddam Hussein.");
Jayachandran et al., supra note 12, at 6-7.
22. See Kremer & Jayachandran, supra note 1, at 86 ("The status quo of the sovereign
debt market indeed seems to be that successor governments, concerned about their
reputation, typically accept responsibility for debt, independent of the nature of the
preceding regime.")
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term damage to their reputations. 3 To be sure, sovereigns have
defaulted on their obligations, or threatened to do so, throughout
history.24 When a sovereign cannot make timely payments on its
obligations or determines that it has an unsustainable level of debt,25
it may default or threaten to do so in hopes of getting some measure
23. The question of why sovereigns repay their obligations is a major theme in
scholarship on sovereign debt. See, e.g., William W. Bratton & G. Mitu Gulati, Sovereign
Debt Reform and the Best Interest of Creditors, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1, 11-17 (2004) (citing
Charles Lipson, The IMF, Commercial Banks, and Third World Debts, in DEBT AND THE
LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES 317, 322-23 (Joshua D. Aronson ed., 1979)); Mitu Gulati
& George Triantis, The Economics of Creditor Control: Sovereign Versus Corporate
Contracts, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2007) (manuscript at 13-14, on file with the
North Carolina Law Review); Jeffrey Sachs, Theoretical Issues in International Borrowing,
in PRINCETON STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL FINANCE NO. 54, at 23 (1984); Jonathan
Eaton & Raquel Fernandez, Sovereign Debt 2-21 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 5131, 1995). The conventional answer to the question is that
sovereigns are restrained by the fear of penalties in the form of higher interest rates or
reduced access to credit in the future. See NOURIEL ROUBINI & BRAD SETSER,
BAILOUTS OR BAIL-INS? 81 (2004); Jonathan Eaton & Mark Gersovitz, Debt with
Potential Repudiation: Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 48 REV. ECON. STUD. 289,
289-90 (1981); Kremer & Jayachandran, supra note 1, at 90; Robert K. Rasmussen,
Integrating a Theory of the State into Sovereign Debt Restructuring, 53 EMORY L.J. 1159,
1177 (2004). Other writers suggest that sovereigns are also restrained by the threat of
more immediate penalties, such as sanctions by third parties. See ROUBINI & SETSER,
supra, at 81; Jeremy Bulow & Kenneth Rogoff, A Constant Recontracting Model of
Sovereign Debt, 97 J. POL. ECON. 155, 157-58 (1989) (finding that reputational costs alone
are not sufficient to give sovereigns incentives to pay); Gulati & Triantis, supra
(manuscript at 14); Michael P. Dooley & Sujata Verma, Rescue Packages and Output
Losses Following Crises 6 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 8315,
2001).
24. Throughout the mid-nineteenth century and the early twentieth century, various
sovereigns experienced financial crises, and a significant amount of this debt was forgiven.
See Jonathan Sedlak, Comment, Sovereign Debt Restructuring: Statutory Reform or
Contractual Solution?, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1483, 1489-90 (2004) (citing Peter H. Lindert &
Peter J. Morton, How Sovereign Debt Has Worked, in DEVELOPING COUNTRY DEBT
AND THE WORLD ECONOMY 225-26 (Jeffrey D. Sachs ed., 1989)). A financial crisis in
Argentina led to the emergence of the Paris Club of creditor nations in 1956. See Randall
Dodd, Sovereign Debt Restructuring, 9 FINANCIER 46, 46 (2002). Since its creation, the
Paris Club has made over 350 agreements concerning the debt of over seventy-five
sovereigns. See id.
25. A sovereign's debt load is arguably unsustainable if it is more than the sovereign
can repay without overtaxing its citizens or under-consuming public goods. Stated another
way, a sovereign debt load is unsustainable if it is "[in]consistent with the country's overall
capacity to make payments." ROUBINI & SETSER, supra note 23, at 172. For explanations
of why reducing debt overhang may be appealing for creditors, see, for example, Bratton
& Gulati, supra note 23, at 18; Paul R. Krugman, Market-Based Debt-Reduction Schemes,
in ANALYTICAL ISSUES IN DEBT 263-66 (Jacob A. Frenkel et al. eds., 1989); Kenneth
Rogoff, Symposium on New Institutions for Developing Country Debt, 4 J. ECON. PERSP. 3
(1990); Jeffrey D. Sachs, The Debt Overhang of Developing Countries, in DEBT,
STABILIZATION, AND DEVELOPMENT 89 (Guillermo Calvo et al. eds., 1986); Joseph E.
Stiglitz & Andrew Weiss, Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information, 71 AM.
ECON. REV. 393, 393-94 (1981); ROUBINI & SETSER, supra note 23, at 172-73.
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of debt relief. It may be able to obtain such relief from the official
sector, from its creditors, or from both.26 In recent decades, sovereign
debt restructuring has become an increasingly common feature of
financial markets. 27  In the last ten years, for example, Russia,
Ukraine, Pakistan, Ecuador, Argentina, Uruguay, and Iraq have all
had a significant amount of external debt restructured and forgiven.2 8
26. Such relief may be in the form of a reduction in the amount of the obligation, a
change in the terms and period of repayment, a change in the asset pool used to repay the
obligation, a change in the tax treatment of proceeds of obligations, or a change in capital
restrictions applicable to payments made against the obligation and so on.
27. The modern era of sovereign debt crises arguably began with a period of relatively
heavy lending to developing countries in the 1970s and 1980s. See Feinerman, supra note
1, at 12; Sedlak, supra note 24, at 1489 n.27 (citing Enrique R. Carrasco & Randall
Thomas, Encouraging Relational Investment and Controlling Portfolio Investment in
Developing Countries in the Aftermath of the Mexican Financial Crisis, 34 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 539, 550-54 (1996)). Beginning in the late 1970s, a number of countries-
such as Jamaica, Peru, South Africa, and Turkey-began experiencing financial crises. See
Paolo Manasse & Nouriel Roubini, "Rules of Thumb" for Sovereign Debt Crises 9 (Int'l
Monetary Fund Working Paper No. 05-42, 2005). In the 1980s, a broader crisis developed
in Latin America involving Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, the Dominican
Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Jamaica, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Peru,
Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, and Venezuela. See id.; Carrasco & Thomas, supra, at
550-54; Sedlak, supra note 24, at 1489. During this period, banks holding sovereign
obligations were initially convinced to restructure their obligations and provide additional
credit to help the sovereigns meet short-term payments. Eventually, in 1989, under the so-
called "Brady Plan," many of these banks swapped their loans for long-term bonds. See
ROUBINI & SETSER, supra note 23, at 12-13; WILLIAM CLINE, INTERNATIONAL DEBT
REEXAMINED 215-22 (1995); JAMES BOUGHTON, SILENT REVOLUTION: THE
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, 1979-1989, at 32 (2001); Jeffrey D. Sachs, A Strategy
for Efficient Debt Reduction, 4 J. ECON. PERSP. 19 (1990) (discussing the role of the Brady
Plan in attempting to alleviate the debt of sovereign nations). For a discussion of the debt
crisis leading up to the enactment of the Brady Plan, see generally FOREIGN DEBT AND
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE (Jeffrey D. Sachs ed., 1989); NAT'L BUREAU OF ECON.
RESEARCH, DEVELOPING COUNTRY DEBT AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE (Jeffrey D.
Sachs ed., 1990). Mexico experienced a major financial crisis in 1994. See RUMU
SARKAR, DEVELOPMENT LAW AND INTERNATIONAL FINANCE 158-61 (2002); Rory
MacMillan, The Next Sovereign Debt Crisis, 31 STAN. J. INT'L L. 305, 308 (1995). The
Mexican crisis was resolved through almost $40 billion in relief committed by the IMF and
the United States. See ROUBINI & SETSER, supra note 23, at 183; SARKAR, supra, at 160;
MacMillan, supra, at 306. A number of countries in Southeast Asia-including Indonesia,
Pakistan, South Korea, and Thailand-experienced crises in the late 1990s. See Sedlak,
supra note 24, at 1489; Duncan E. Williams, Note, Policy Perspectives on the Use of Capital
Controls in Emerging Market Nations: Lessons from the Asian Financial Crisis and a Look
at the International Legal Regime, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 561, 564-70 (2001).
28. For a comprehensive study of recent sovereign debt restructuring and creditor
"haircuts," see Federico Sturzenegger & Jeromin Zettelmeyer, Haircuts: Estimating
Investor Losses in Sovereign Restructurings, 1998-2005, at 3-4 (Int'l Monetary Fund
Working Paper No. 05-137, 2005) (describing recent debt restructuring by Russia,
Ukraine, Pakistan, Ecuador, Argentina, and Uruguay). Broadly speaking, these most
recent restructurings have been characterized by some combination of emergency
financing, voluntary agreement by creditors to swap existing obligations for new ones, and
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These restructurings have ultimately been conducted with the
grudging consent of creditors and they have generally been sought by
sovereigns on economic grounds. Where a sovereign's debt load is
unsustainable, it may be in its creditors' interest for the sovereign to
reduce its overall debt-load or adjust the nature of its obligations to
improve sustainability.29
The experience of post-Hussein Iraq is instructive though
somewhat unique. Iraq obtained debt relief from its creditors against
the dramatic backdrop of efforts by the United Nations and the
United States to institute what one writer has described as a
"backdoor bankruptcy."3 At the urging of the U.S. government and
its allies, most of Iraq's bilateral creditors agreed to restructure their
claims against Iraq in late 2004 and early 2005, reducing Iraqi
obligations by tens of billions of dollars.3' Aside from the claims of
these bilateral creditors, Iraq inherited approximately $20 billion in
Hussein-era obligations owed to private commercial creditors. In late
December of 2005, Iraq negotiated a restructuring of most of its
efforts to pressure creditors who resist the voluntary swap. This general combination of
factors has been described as a "bail-in" to distinguish it from the heavy official-sector
rescues, or bailouts, of the recent past. For a comprehensive study of this shift in
approaches, see ROUBINI & SETSER, supra note 23, at 119-80.
29. See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
30. Gelpern, Iraq and Argentina, supra note 1, at 394-96. In 2003, the United Nations
Security Council effectively stayed collection efforts against Iraq's oil and gas assets and
other assets located in member nations. Id.
31. Id. at 402 ("Thanks to all out U.S. diplomacy, Iraq has secured a reduction of 80
percent in principal and past due interest from the Paris Club of government leaders, and
promised the Paris Club to seek comparable relief from the rest of its creditors.").
Creditor nations that are members of the Paris Club held $20 billion to $40 billion in Iraqi
debt when the Hussein regime fell. They agreed to restructure those obligations, writing
off over three-quarters of that amount. The arrangement entailed a phaseout of the
restructured debt over a four-year period. See Iraqi Debt Write-Off Wins Approval, BBC
NEWS, Nov. 21, 2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/4029905.stm. Other nations
outside the Paris Club-especially Kuwait, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia-have apparently
also restructured debts owed to them by Iraq on terms similar to the Paris Club deal. See
Saudis Offer To Slash Iraqi Debt, BBC NEWS, Jan. 21, 2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk/
2/hilbusiness/3418357.stm. As of December 2006, thirty-four non-Paris Club creditors had
forgiven most or all of their claims against Iraq. See Indonesia Cancels 80% ofIraqi Debt,
BALI TIMES, Dec. 1, 2006, http://www.thebalitimes.com/2006/12/01/indonesia-cancels-80-
of-iraqi-debt. The debts owed to these non-Paris Club bilateral creditors had totaled $60
billion to $80 billion. See Jubilee Iraq, Saddam's Debts Today (Latest Estimates),
http://www.jubileeiraq.org/debt-today.htm (last visited Jan. 22, 2007). These
arrangements apparently do not address war reparations claimed by Kuwait stemming
from Iraq's occupation of that country in the lead-up to the first Gulf War. See id.
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commercial debts by offering an exchange of new debt for old
commercial debt.32
When Iraq's creditors did ultimately agree to restructure and
forgive Hussein-era obligations, they did not do so on equitable
grounds.33 And the Iraqi regime claimed at the time that it was not
seeking debt relief based on such grounds.34 Nonetheless, it appears
that Iraqi officials may have used (or benefited implicitly from) the
threat of repudiating Iraq's debts to help persuade creditors to
restructure the sovereign's obligations. 5 More recently, it appears
that Nigeria may have used a similar threat in attempting to secure
debt restructuring. 36  Still, many countries across the globe are
burdened by significant debts incurred by oppressive regimes that do
not appear to have provided any value to their citizens.37 While Iraq
managed to secure debt relief with the consent of its creditors,
discussion of the quality of Iraq's debt appears to have awakened a
more general interest in the topic of odious debt. A number of
32. See Andrew Balls & Joanna Chung, Critical Phase in Debt Restructuring
Completed, FIN. TIMES (London), Dec. 24-25, 2005, at 5, available at 2005 WLNR
20898528; Joanna Chung, Iraq's Debt Solution Ruffles Feathers, FIN. TIMES (London),
Dec. 21, 2005, at 37, available at 2005 WLNR 20626291. Apparently, this exchange
represented sixty percent of Iraq's commercial debts. Balls & Chung, supra. Iraq had
previously repurchased some of its other commercial debts before this exchange. Id.
33. It is worth noting that, even if Iraq had formally asserted before a court or
tribunal that its inherited debts were odious, it is not at all clear that a decisionmaker
would have found any of these debts to be odious. To the extent that the proceeds of
debts incurred by Hussein were actually, or even arguably, used for the benefit of citizens
of Iraq, they would presumably not have been deemed odious under the traditional
definition. But see Adams, supra note 1, at 1 ("Most debts created by Saddam Hussein in
the name of the Iraqi people would qualify as 'odious' according to the international
Doctrine of Odious Debts."). Adams acknowledges that some Iraqi debt was incurred for
"legitimate governmental purposes and in the interests of the public" but argues that most
of the debt "went to a repressive state machinery, to arms, and to palaces." Id. at 9.
34. At least according to public statements by Iraqi officials, they were not inclined to
unilaterally repudiate the Hussein-era obligations. See Gelpern, Iraq and Argentina, supra
note 1, at 406; Buchheit et al., supra note 1 (manuscript at 19-21 n.64). The issue quickly
became moot, however, as debt relief was forthcoming.
35. See, e.g., Buchheit et al., supra note 1, (manuscript at 20-21 n.64) (quoting Ali
Allawi, Iraq's Minister of Finance, as expressing sympathy for the view that Hussein's
debts were illegitimate).
36. See Nigeria To Get $18bn Debt Relief, BBC NEWS, June 30, 2005,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/4637395.stm. As this Article goes to print, Ecuador is
threatening to repudiate some of its external obligations as "illegitimate." See, e.g.,
Ecuador, Calling Debt 'Illegitimate,' May Repay 40%, BLOOMBERG NEWS, Jan. 18, 2007,
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=aLG4apB1PUpO&refer=home.
37. According to various authors, the following are examples of countries that have
significant obligations that could potentially be characterized as odious: Nicaragua,
Philippines, Haiti, South Africa, Congo (formerly Zaire), Nigeria, and Croatia. See
Buchheit et al., supra note 1 (manuscript at 4).
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writers and advocates have continued to try to identify mechanisms
that might provide a measure of odious debt relief to other countries.
The remainder of this Part describes some of the proposed
mechanisms and notes some of the threshold formal and institutional
challenges facing these existing proposals.
A. The Traditional Doctrine
Some proponents of repudiating Iraq's Hussein-era debt and
other debt relief advocates have argued that there is an international
legal doctrine of odious debt. According to this account, Alexander
Sack first identified the doctrine of odious debt as a component of
customary international law.38  Sack argued that under public
international law, a sovereign obligation is odious if: (1) the proceeds
of the obligation do not benefit the population of a sovereign; (2) the
obligation is incurred without their consent; and (3) the creditor
knows these facts.39 According to Sack, odious debts do not become
obligations of the state; a succeeding government, for example, is not
obligated to repay such debts. These obligations are essentially
personal debts of the regime that incurred them without the consent
and against the interests of the population."n They are subject to
repudiation if the borrower (or its agent) elects to object to
enforcement. To borrow language from other legal domains, these
debts are voidable.n
If viable, the doctrine that Sack articulated represents an
important exception to the general principle of customary
international law that governments inherit the rights and obligations
of the regimes they succeed.42 In elaborating this doctrine of odious
38. For discussions of the legal history of the odious debt doctrine, see, for example,
Feinerman, supra note 1, at 1-12; Khalfan, King & Thomas, supra note 1, at 22-34;
Buchheit et al., supra note 1 (manuscript at 12-21); Gelpern, Iraq and Argentina, supra
note 1, at 403-06. For an early discussion of the legal doctrine, see ERNST H.
FEILCHENFELD, PUBLIC DEBTS AND STATE SUCCESSION 862 (1931); DANIEL P.
O'CONNELL, STATE SUCCESSION IN MUNICIPAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 458-62
(1967); James L. Foorman & Michael E. Jehle, Effects of State and Government Succession
on Commercial Bank Loans to Foreign Sovereign Borrowers, 1982 U. ILL. L. REV. 9, 21-25
(1982); Gunter Frankenburg & Rolf Knieper, Legal Problems of the Overindebtedness of
Developing Countries: The Current Relevance of the Doctrine of Odious Debts, 12 INT'L J.
SOC. L. 415, 431 (1984).
39. See Buchheit et al., supra note 1 (manuscript at 16).
40. See Buchheit et al., supra note 1 (manuscript at 15); Khalfan, King & Thomas,
supra note 1, at 15.
41. See, e.g., Khalfan, King & Thomas, supra note 1, at 2 ("[O]ne should not claim
that odious debts are illegal under international law.").
42. See, e.g., Gelpern, Iraq and Argentina, supra note 1, at 404.
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debt, Sack and subsequent commentators rely heavily on a few
historical examples. One of the primary episodes that Sack offered as
evidence of the doctrine was the repudiation of Cuban debt by the
United States in the wake of the Spanish-American War.43 The debt
in question had been incurred by Spain, apparently to suppress
independence movements in Cuba.' When Cuba achieved
independence, Spain argued that Cuba was responsible for the debt.
In postwar negotiations, the United States asserted that the debt was
odious and thus not enforceable.4" While Spain rejected the equitable
claim, it eventually stopped asserting that Cuba had to honor the
obligations.46
Upon reflection, however, the dispute over this Cuban debt
seems to be tenuously connected to the broad definition of odious
debt that Sack had set forth. As others have noted, this episode
appears to have been an example of state succession, not government
succession.47 State succession occurs when a territory ceases to be
part of one state and becomes part of another. Government
succession, by contrast, occurs when a state retains its basic integrity
but experiences a transition of governing regimes. 48 A number of
other episodes that have historically been described as evidence of
state practice of repudiating odious debt similarly appear to be
instances of state succession. For example, England refused to honor
debts incurred by the Boer Republics in the course of conflict
between them; 49 the early Soviet government refused to pay much of
the debt of Tsarist Russia; ° the United States refused to pay claims of
the Republic of Texas after Texas became an American state;51 in
1883, Mexico repudiated debt incurred by the Hapsburg monarchy in
the course of attempting to sustain colonial control over Mexico;
5 2
43. See Buchheit et al., supra note 1 (manuscript at 11-13); Gelpern, Iraq and
Argentina, supra note 1, at 403-05; Khalfan, King & Thomas, supra note 1, at 25-26 (citing
FEILCHENFELD, supra note 38, at 328).
44. See Gelpern, Iraq and Argentina, supra note 1, at 404.
45. See Khalfan, King & Thomas, supra note 1, at 25.
46. See Gelpern, Iraq and Argentina, supra note 1, at 405.
47. See Khalfan, King & Thomas, supra note 1, at 21-29; Buchheit et al., supra note 1
(manuscript at 11-17); O'CONNELL, supra note 38, at 461-62.
48. Admittedly, it can be difficult to distinguish state and government succession,
especially in the context of social revolutions. See, e.g., Khalfan, King & Thomas, supra
note 1, at 47 (citing O'CONNELL, supra note 38, at vi); IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 673-74 (1998) (criticizing the distinction).
49. See Khalfan, King & Thomas, supra note 1, at 26. Significantly, England did
eventually pay a fraction of those debts. Id.
50. See id. at 27.
51. See id. at 22.
52. See id. at 24.
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under the Treaty of Versailles, Poland was not obliged to honor
certain debts that Germany (and Prussia before Germany) had
incurred in Poland's name in the wake of annexing Polish regions;" in
1919 and 1920, the government of Costa Rica repudiated obligations
incurred by the short-lived, revolutionary government of Federico
Tinoco;54 and finally, some countries-especially African countries
such as Tanzania, Eritrea, Rwanda, and Burundi-have repudiated
debts incurred by their colonial regimes." These kinds of disputes
over sovereign debt have occurred in more recent history as well.
The International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia's working
group on succession is currently working to determine apportionment
of debts of the former Yugoslavia among its successor states. 6
As these episodes suggest, there is some historical evidence that
states sometimes repudiate obligations in the context of state
succession, especially in the wake of war or hostilities or
decolonization. There is arguably some evidence of repudiation in
the context of government successions, including the examples of
Tsarist Russia and Costa Rica described above. It is questionable,
however, whether such cases reflect a doctrinal exception to the
general rule of repayment in the case of government succession.
Furthermore, most countries that experience revolutionary or post-
colonial transitions do not repudiate existing obligations.58
53. See id. at 27.
54. See id. at 41. A dispute arising from Costa Rica's action in this episode ended up
in arbitration, with U.S. Supreme Court Chief Justice Taft acting as arbitrator. He found
that the country's act was valid because the funds had not been used by Tinoco for a
legitimate governmental purpose. Id.; Great Britain v. Costa Rica, 2 Ann. Dig. 34 (1923).
55. See Khalfan, King & Thomas, supra note 1, at 31.
56. See id. at 28.
57. See Gelpern, Iraq and Argentina, supra note 1, at 406 ("[N]o national or
international tribunal has ever cited Odious Debt as grounds for invalidating a sovereign
obligation."). It does appear that the concept or doctrine of odiousness was raised,
unsuccessfully, in disputes over obligations owed by China and Iran. See Buchheit et al.,
supra note 1 (manuscript at 19-20) (citing Jackson v. People's Republic of China, 550 F.
Supp. 869, 872 (N.D. Ala. 1982); Jackson v. People's Republic of China, 794 F.2d 1490,
1495 (11th Cir. 1986); United States v. Iran, 32 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 162 (1996)).
58. See Khalfan, King & Thomas, supra note 1, at 31 (noting that "most African states
did in fact assume colonial debts but never recognized that they were obliged by law to do
so"); id. at 29 (noting that countries including France, Spain, Portugal, the Netherlands,
Bavaria, Mexico, Ecuador, Brazil, Costa Rica, Turkey, and Germany did not repudiate
debts incurred by pre-revolutionary regimes).
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B. Other Proposals
1. Domestic Law
Due in part to uncertainty about the status of the traditional
doctrine of odious debt noted above, some commentators have
proposed addressing odious debt with alternative doctrines.59 Lee
Buchheit, Mitu Gulati, and Robert Thompson have proposed, for
example, that sovereigns might raise arguments sounding in domestic
commercial/corporate law to defend against enforcement of their
obligations. 6 Their proposal is based in part on the likelihood that
litigation over potentially odious debt will occur in domestic courts in
the United States.6 They propose that sovereign debts could be
found unenforceable under contract law as against public policy;62
under the equitable doctrine of unclean hands;63 under agency
doctrines; or pursuant to defenses analogous to corporate veil-
piercing.' 4 Under American law of agency, for example, a principal is
59. See, e.g., Buchheit et al., supra note 1 (manuscript at 29-47) (exploring the
relevance of domestic private legal doctrines); Adam Feibelman, Equitable Subordination
and Sovereign Debt, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. (forthcoming 2007) (manuscript at 4, on
file with the North Carolina Law Review) (proposing that non-odious creditors could
employ the doctrine of equitable subordination against odious creditors).
60. See Buchheit et al., supra note 1 (manuscript at 28-48); see also Gelpern, Iraq and
Argentina, supra note 1, at 411-12 (noting that the Tinoco case can arguably be seen as a
precedent for using domestic law concepts to effectively fashion a new odious debt
doctrine).
61. This is a reasonable working assumption. There has been an increase in litigation
over sovereign debt throughout the last decade, and much of the recent litigation has been
in United States courts, mostly federal courts. See, e.g., Urban v. Argentina, No. 02 Civ.
5699 (TPG), 2004 WL 307293 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 17, 2004) (certifying a class of creditors suing
the sovereign); Lightwater Corp., Ltd. v. Argentina, No. 02 Civ. 3804, 2003 WL 1878420
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 14, 2003) (rejecting the sovereign's request for a stay of litigation to
negotiate with creditors). Other recent cases include Af-Cap, Inc. v. Congo, 462 F.3d 417
(5th Cir. 2006) (defining tax revenue and royalties received by the sovereign as
"commercial activity" and subject to attachment because they were transferred to another
creditor); Turkmani v. Bolivia, 193 F. Supp. 2d 165 (D.D.C. 2002); Hirshon v. Bolivia, 979
F. Supp. 908 (D.D.C. 1997); Kensington Int'l, Ltd. v. BNP Paribas, S.A., No. 03602569
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 24, 2005) (unpublished opinion on file with the North Carolina Law
Review); see also Jill E. Fisch & Caroline M. Gentile, Vultures or Vanguards?: The Role
of Litigation in Sovereign Debt Restructuring, 53 EMORY L.J. 1043, 1045 (2004); Charles D.
Schmerler, Defaulted Sovereign Debt? Litigate It!, N.Y. L.J., Feb. 22, 2005, http://www.
law.com/jsp/nylj/PubArticleNY.jsp?id=1108992913591.
62. See Buchheit et al., supra note 1 (manuscript at 28-30).
63. See id. (manuscript at 30-32).
64. See id. (manuscript at 37-39). Under corporate law, the obligations of a
corporation generally do not extend to its shareholders. Under some circumstances,
however, a creditor can reach the assets of the corporation's shareholders. These writers
propose that a sovereign is essentially a corporate entity, but that its corporate status
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generally bound by the actions of its agent if the agent was acting with
authority-actual or apparent-to bind the principal.65 An agent may
not have authority to bind the principal, however, if it is clear to a
third party that the principal derives no benefit from the proposed
transaction.66 In such a case, the third party bears the risk that the
agent is acting without authority. 67 This principle might provide that
a creditor cannot enforce certain obligations incurred by a regime
that did not benefit the sovereign.68 The leader or government of a
sovereign is arguably an agent for the present and future population
of the sovereign nation. 69  A leader may lose authority to bind the
sovereign principal in a transaction with a creditor if the creditor
knows that the sovereign will derive no benefit from the transaction.
Domestic private law doctrines may have fewer practical
threshold challenges than the traditional odious debt doctrine. First,
unlike the odious debt doctrine, there will not be threshold questions
about whether these familiar doctrines exist.70 Second, a domestic
court relying on domestic private legal doctrines to resolve a dispute
over sovereign obligations may have fewer institutional concerns than
it would if it were asked to apply international customary law or other
international legal doctrines.71 A domestic court hearing these claims
could be dissolved if its leaders collude with third parties to harm the entity and its
shareholders. Id. (manuscript at 38-39).
65. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 7-8 (1958).
66. See Buchheit et al., supra note 1 (manuscript at 34-35); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF AGENCY § 262 cmt. a (1958).
67. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 262 cmt. a (1958).
68. See Buchheit et al., supra note 1 (manuscript at 35-37).
69. See id. (manuscript at 33).
70. The doctrine should be available pursuant to the laws of New York or England as
specified by agreement. See Buchheit et al., supra note 1 (manuscript at 29). See generally
Deborah A. DeMott, Agency by Analogy: A Comment on Odious Debt, LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. (forthcoming 2007) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review)
(evaluating the application of agency concepts to sovereign debt disputes).
71. Even if international law recognizes a doctrine of odious debt, it might be difficult
to convince courts to apply the doctrine to discharge sovereign obligations. This is
especially true of domestic courts, a likely venue for litigation over sovereign debt. See
supra note 61 and accompanying text. As an initial matter, there is some debate about the
formal status of customary international law in U.S. domestic courts. See generally Curtis
A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal Common Law:
A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815 (1997) (criticizing the
conventional view that customary international law generally has the status of federal
common law); A.M. Weisburd, State Courts, Federal Courts, and International Cases, 20
YALE J. INT'L L. 1 (1995) (same); Curtis A. Bradley et al., Sosa, Customary International
Law, and the Continuing Relevance of Erie (Aug. 2006) (unpublished manuscript, on file
with the North Carolina Law Review) (same). But see Harold Hongju Koh, The 2004
Term: The Supreme Court Meets International Law, 12 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. 1, 12
(2004) (arguing that the Supreme Court has recognized the conventional view). Domestic
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would be working with a familiar doctrinal backdrop. Private law
doctrines such as agency or corporate veil-piercing are relatively thick
and well developed. Assuming that a domestic court is satisfied that
it has jurisdiction over a particular dispute, it should have basic
institutional confidence in applying domestic commercial law to the
dispute.
2. Other Institutions
While Iraq was working to restructure its obligations, a group of
nongovernmental organizations and individuals proposed that an
independent tribunal should be created and given the responsibility
to designate certain Iraqi debts as odious.72 They argued that "[t]he
debts which Saddam owes cannot be legitimately passed on to the
Iraqi people without assessment by an arbitration tribunal employing
the doctrine of odious debts to assess whether the Iraqi people
benefited from these loans."73 They proposed that the tribunal be
patterned after the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, which was
established in 1981 to resolve claims that stemmed from the Iranian
Revolution.74 Such a tribunal would presumably be created through
political negotiation between the new Iraqi regime and creditor states
(or the home governments of Iraq's creditors). These advocates
proposed that the tribunal adopt the arbitration framework of the
United Nations Committee on International Trade Law.75 They also
proposed that the agreements creating the tribunal would stipulate
that the Sackian doctrine of odious debt would have the force of law
in the tribunal's deliberations.76 Finally, they proposed that creditor
courts might have institutional concerns or hesitation about applying customary
international law in general and about finding sovereign obligations unenforceable in
particular. Such courts may not have robust institutional self-confidence to apply
customary international law in such a way as to effectively discharge sovereign obligations.
See generally Stephan, supra note 1 (exploring institutional issues related to the odious
debt doctrine and to customary international law in general). Some writers have
considered whether odious debt claims might be raised before the International Court of
Justice. See Khalfan, King & Thomas, supra note 1, at 58-65. Such an approach might
give rise to fewer institutional concerns than asserting the doctrine in litigation before
domestic courts.
72. See Jubilee Iraq, Preliminary Structural and Procedural Aspects of Iraq Debt
Tribunal, http://www.jubileeiraq.org/tribunal.htm (last visited Feb. 1, 2007); see also
Gelpern, Iraq and Argentina, supra note 1, at 403 (citing the proposal).
73. See Jubilee Iraq, supra note 9.
74. See Jubilee Iraq, supra note 72. The Iran-United States Claims Tribunal adopted
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nations who agree to create the tribunal should also agree to halt or
avoid litigation over Iraqi debt in their domestic courts.77 While the
need for an Iraqi debt tribunal is essentially moot after the country's
debt restructuring, a debt-claims tribunal remains an interesting
potential mechanism for addressing similar disputes in other contexts.
Such a tribunal would face some predictable practical threshold
challenges of its own.78 Most notably, there will be significant
political challenges in creating such an entity in the first place. As
proponents of the Iraqi debt tribunal acknowledge, the Iran-U.S.
tribunal was adopted because there were strong political forces
balanced on either side of a dispute between two powerful parties.79
It is not at all clear whether or when this kind of ex post balance of
interests will recur in any particular context. Such a tribunal would
be feasible in some contexts but perhaps not others. Not only would
this create uncertainty, it would give rise to significant costs; parties
would need to invest time and/or resources in each separate context
to promote creating a tribunal and then putting one in place.. Where
it is possible to create a tribunal of this kind in the first place, it will
be difficult to insulate the tribunal from ongoing political influences.8"
Two economists, Michael Kremer and Seema Jayachandran,
have proposed creating an ongoing international tribunal or some
similar institution to evaluate the relative odiousness of existing
regimes as opposed to the odiousness of particular debts.8" They
model the effect of a "hypothetical perfectly truthful institution" that
would be charged with determining whether particular sovereign
regimes are odious.82 They propose that major powers could create
an entirely new odious debt institution for this purpose or that
designations under the scheme could be made by the United Nations
Security Council.83 Their model predicts that a regime succeeding
one that the institution designated as odious could disavow the debts
incurred by the odious regime without suffering damage to its
77. See id.
78. See Paulus, supra note 1, at 92-95 (critiquing the odious debt tribunal proposals).
79. See Jubilee Iraq, supra note 72.
80. See infra note 87 and accompanying text.
81. See Kremer & Jayachandran, supra note 1, at 90. They propose that major powers
could create an entirely new odious debt institution or that designations under the scheme
could be made by the United Nations Security Council. See id. at 91-92.
82. Michael Kremer & Seema Jayachandran, Odious Debt 2 (Apr. 2002)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
83. See Kremer & Jayachandran, supra note 1, at 91; see also Bolton & Skeel, supra
note 1 (manuscript at 3) (proposing an approach to odious debt in which the United
Nations and/or the International Monetary Fund would designate regimes as odious).
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reputation and its ability to borrow in the future.' More significantly,
most non-odious creditors would presumably avoid lending to
regimes designated as odious or would charge a much higher interest
rate to do so. The few creditors who would willingly lend to such a
regime designated as odious would do so at such a risk that they
would have to charge high, if not prohibitive, rates.85 As Anna
Gelpern has noted, such a scheme would "remove some reputational
damage to a country from repudiating odious debt, would shield the
country from lawsuits, and would enable meaningful risk assessment
by creditors. Most importantly, it may discourage lending to
oppressive governments and free their people from responsibility for
the debts."86
Despite these advantages, this proposal will face political
obstacles similar to those noted above. 7 Here, however, the political
pressures may be even greater because the international community
will be asked to create an ongoing institution with a broad-ranging
mandate. The consequences of designating a sovereign as odious will
be very significant, and the international community will presumably
be skeptical of creating an institution with this power over
sovereigns." Furthermore, unlike a sovereign-specific claims
tribunal, no sovereign will be able to ensure that it will not become a
target of the institution. Sovereigns might believe that they would be
ceding too much of their own sovereignty by creating such an
institution.
84. See Bolton & Skeel, supra note 1 (manuscript at 3).
85. The cost of credit for sovereigns at risk of being designated as odious would
presumably increase as well. See, e.g., Rajan, supra note 1, at 54. Rajan notes that the
value of debts incurred before an odious designation would likely be affected by the
prospect of a potential subsequent designation. This is true even though the mechanism
would purport to affect only future debts; sovereigns will be more likely to default on
existing debts if future credit is not forthcoming.
86. See Gelpern, Iraq and Argentina, supra note 1, at 413.
87. See supra note 80 and accompanying text. Such a scheme would presumably be at
least as difficult to create as the tribunal discussed above that would review sovereign
debts for odiousness ex post. Given the broader effect of an ex ante designation, these
difficulties might be much greater, although Kremer and Jayachandran claim the opposite.
See Kremer & Jayachandran supra note 1, at 90-91. They argue that if such an institution
were to judge only the potential odiousness of future debts, then it would be relatively
unlikely to be affected by biases or political influences favoring either creditors or the
populations of sovereign debtors. Id. Gelpern suggests that "the institutional design
challenge is no greater than in the case of trade sanctions, and the overall framework is
sensible and innovative." Gelpern, Iraq and Argentina, supra note 1, at 413.
88. The development of the International Criminal Court provides an example of the
difficulty in creating an international tribunal with significant power over powerful
sovereigns. See, e.g., Paul B. Stephan, U.S. Constitutionalism and International Law: What
the Multilateralist Move Leaves Out, 2 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 11, 12-13 (2004).
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Finally, some commentators have noted that a formal sovereign
bankruptcy regime might provide a useful mechanism for enabling
sovereigns to discharge their odious obligations.89  The procedural
architecture of a bankruptcy system enables troubled debtors and
their creditors to identify claims against the debtor, define the
debtor's assets, and then determine how to apportion the assets to the
various claimants. In general, a bankruptcy system can promote
efficient restructuring of a debtor's capital structure to maximize
creditors' collective recovery. Bankruptcy systems also provide a
useful procedure for distinguishing different classes of obligations and
for enforcing priority among them.90 Most significantly, domestic
bankruptcy law allows for subordination of some inequitable debt.91
A sovereign bankruptcy scheme could serve these functions; it could
provide efficient sovereign debt relief in general and include
provisions for subordinating or discharging odious debt in particular.'
The practical obstacles to creating a sovereign bankruptcy
scheme are not hypothetical. In fact, despite widespread interest in
developing a bankruptcy regime for sovereigns, it has proven to be
intractably difficult to do so. In recent years, officials at the
International Monetary Fund ("IMF") proposed a Sovereign Debt
89. See NOREENA HERTZ, THE DEBT THREAT 187-94 (2004) ("[D]omestic
bankruptcy ... provides us with a good basis on which to design a mechanism for
determining which sovereign debts are unpayable or illegitimate, and how debtors and
creditors should be treated as a result."); Stiglitz, supra note 1, at 42 (arguing that a
bankruptcy system for sovereigns could provide relief from obligations incurred by outlaw
or odious regimes pursuant to rules established by the United Nations).
90. In the private bankruptcy context, bankruptcy law generally enforces priorities or
seniority among and between creditors by respecting differences between secured and
nonsecured creditors and other voluntary contractual arrangements. It often alters
privately ordered priorities to create priorities for credit extended for administrative
purposes in bankruptcy, to secure interim or emergency financing, or to reflect certain
social policies. See 11 U.S.C. § 507 (2000) (setting forth priorities among unsecured claims
in bankruptcy).
91. Bankruptcy law in the United States has codified the doctrine of equitable
subordination. See id. § 510(c). Section 510(c) provides that a bankruptcy court may
"under principles of equitable subordination subordinate for purposes of distribution all
or part" of a claim or interest. Id. The test for subordination under this provision is that
"(i) [tihe claimant must have engaged in some type of inequitable conduct [and] (ii) [t]he
misconduct must have resulted in injury to the creditors of the bankrupt or conferred an
unfair advantage on the claimant." In re Mobile Steel Co., 563 F.2d 692, 700 (5th Cir.
1977) (citation omitted). Claims that are subordinated under this provision are often the
product of fraud, misrepresentation, breach of fiduciary duties, illegality, or actions by
insiders that hurt the financial positions of creditors to the corporation.
92. Significant for present purposes, a bankruptcy scheme could also enforce a
contractual arrangement that provided for repudiation of odious debts.
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Restructuring Mechanism ("SDRM").93 The SDRM proposal was
largely motivated by an interest in undermining the ability of
creditors to effectively hold up sovereign debt restructuring
arrangements by refusing to participate or by pursuing independent
enforcement activities.94 The IMF's SDRM proposal envisioned a
"minimal bankruptcy" scheme, with features that would effectively
stay collection efforts, provide priority for new credit, allow for a
cramdown of dissenting creditors, and provide a formal structure for
negotiating the restructuring of obligations.95 Sovereign bond market
participants in the United States and officials in the U.S. Treasury
were apparently some of the main opponents of the IMF's SDRM
scheme.96 The proposal was apparently shelved in April 2003, 97 and it
does not appear that its proponents are seeking to revive the proposal
in the near future.98
At present, then, the issue of odious debt presents a vexing
challenge. There seems to be broad agreement that sovereigns
should not incur odious debt and that, ideally, successor regimes
should not be required to repay such debt. But there are serious
practical challenges to implementing any of the doctrines or
institutions discussed above. Furthermore, as explained below in Part
III, these solutions are not well suited to limiting the negative
93. For a discussion of the proposal supported by the IMF, see, for example, Bratton
& Gulati, supra note 23, at 26-43.
94. "[E]rosion of sovereign immunities since the 1950's" has led to an increase in
lawsuits brought by sovereigns' creditors, Gelpern, Iraq and Argentina, supra note 1, at
396, even though sovereigns can still effectively thwart creditors' efforts to enforce
judgments. See id. at 396-97; Gulati & Triantis, supra note 23 (manuscript at 13-14);
Patrick Bolton & David A. Skeel, Jr., Inside the Black Box: How Should a Sovereign
Bankruptcy Framework Be Structured?, 53 EMORY L.J. 763, 781 (2004). Significantly,
commentators have been concerned that bondholders will become more active and more
successful in both suing and trying to enforce judgments. See, e.g., Gelpern, Iraq and
Argentina, supra note 1, at 396-97.
95. See Bratton & Gulati, supra note 23, at 26; Gelpern, Iraq and Argentina, supra
note 1, at 398-99; Anne Krueger, First Deputy Managing Dir., Int'l Monetary Fund,
International Financial Architecture for 2002: A New Approach to Sovereign Debt
Restructuring, Address at the National Economists' Club Annual Members' Dinner (Nov.
26,2001), http://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2001/112601.htm.
96. Bolton & Skeel, supra note 94, at 764-65. They were purportedly concerned that
the scheme might encourage sovereign bankruptcies and that this would destabilize the
market for sovereign debt. Id.; ROUBINI & SETSER, supra note 23, at 289-90.
97. Gelpern, Iraq and Argentina, supra note 1, at 399; Feinerman, supra note 1, at 22.
98. Some commentators have recently argued that a formal sovereign bankruptcy
regime is either unnecessary or unappealing compared to ad hoc approaches to sovereign
debt restructuring. See, e.g., LEX RIEFFEL, RESTRUCTURING SOVEREIGN DEBT: THE
CASE FOR AD Hoc MACHINERY 18 (2003). In any event, the remainder of this Article
assumes that a sovereign bankruptcy is not likely to emerge in the near future.
2007]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
economic consequences for sovereigns that repudiate their odious
debts. Some commentators have suggested that no practicable
mechanism for repudiating odious debt can be created; some of these
writers have proposed that sovereign debtors with odious debts frame
their efforts to get debt relief in terms of their inability to repay.99
This Article is more sanguine; it does not argue that the proposals for
an odious debt mechanism discussed above are fatally flawed or
ultimately infeasible. It is possible that any one or some combination
of them would represent an improvement over the status quo.
Rather, Parts II and III argue that a contractual approach to odious
debt may be more feasible and more appealing than these
alternatives.
II. A CONTRACTUAL ODIOUS DEBT MECHANISM
This Part describes a contractual approach to the odious debt
problem. It explains how parties could adopt such a mechanism; it
then explains how they might define odious debt, provide for it to be
designated, and enforce the repudiation of debts designated as
odious.1"' This Part assumes that sovereigns and their creditors will
have incentives to adopt such a mechanism; the following Part
defends that assumption. 1 '
A. The Contractual Arrangement
To avoid complicated transitional concerns for a moment,
imagine the hypothetical case of a new sovereign with no existing
creditors.102 To adopt a contractual odious debt mechanism, the
sovereign could expressly promise its initial creditors that it will not
incur odious debt. The parties could expressly acknowledge that their
credit arrangement does not create an odious obligation by
designating the purpose of their transaction. They could further
provide that if any debt owed by the sovereign is determined to be
odious, then the sovereign agrees to repudiate that obligation. As
discussed below, the parties would presumably include a contractual
99. See, e.g., Gelpern, Iraq and Argentina, supra note 1, at 407. See generally Rajan,
supra note 1 (expressing skepticism about proposals to address the odious debt problem).
100. As noted above, supra note 13, an odious debt relief mechanism might provide for
repudiation or some form of subordination. For the sake of simplicity, this discussion uses
the term repudiation; a contractual mechanism could just as easily provide for
subordination of debt or some other form of altering seniority for debts designated as
odious. Either approach creates a form of priority in the broadest sense of the term.
101. This assumption is examined infra in Part III.C.
102. Complicated transition problems are addressed infra in Part II.B.2.
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definition of odious debt in their agreements. 103 The sovereign could
also commit to require its subsequent creditors to agree to adopt the
same contractual arrangement. °4 By promising its initial creditors
that it will require subsequent creditors to opt into the arrangement,
the sovereign not only sets the contractual mechanism in place, but it
also further commits itself to avoid incurring odious debt.10 5 A breach
of any of the promises or commitments noted above would be an
event of default by the sovereign borrower.
Given that the sovereign may subsequently try to cheat or shirk,
creditors opting in to the arrangement will want to try to put other
potential creditors on notice that they intend to honor and enforce
the scheme. Bondholders may be in a relatively good position to do
this; sovereigns already disclose at least some of the terms of their
bonds pursuant to securities regulation." 6 Purchasers could insist that
sovereigns disclose the arrangement. Private or bilateral creditors
may have a harder time putting other creditors on notice; they might
try to advertise the arrangement in other ways, perhaps through
publication. It is also possible that creditors, sovereigns, or other
entities could create a recording or disclosure mechanism specifically
designed for such arrangements. 10 7 Furthermore, if such a scheme
becomes conventional, creditors will increasingly be on constructive
notice to inquire of sovereign debtors whether there are any odious
debt agreements in force. As discussed below, such notice may or
may not be given formal effect,' but it may help deter some creditors
from extending odious debt in the first place.
If a sovereign and its creditors agree that the sovereign will
repudiate any odious debt it incurs, the agreement will have to
indicate how those debts will be identified. The parties could
theoretically designate an independent decisionmaker for this
purpose. They might agree, for example, to allow creditors to enforce
the agreement in U.S. courts or before an international tribunal.
103. See infra Part II.D.
104. The sovereign itself will contract with all subsequent voluntary creditors and
should be in a position to insist upon these subsequent agreements. See infra notes 129-30
and accompanying text.
105. See infra Part II.B.1.
106. See, e.g., Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, An Empirical Study of Securities
Disclosure Practice, 80 TUL. L. REV. 1023, 1027 (2006) (explaining that a sovereign bond
issue prospectus and prospectus supplement will disclose certain information about the
terms of the underlying bond contract).
107. It is possible, for example, that a public institution like the IMF could manage
such a registry and help publicize the information. Rating agencies could presumably
disseminate this information as well.
108. See infra notes 114-15 and accompanying text.
2007]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Such an arrangement would effectively mimic by contract one or
more of the alternative mechanisms discussed above. The parties
might also consider giving the responsibility to designate odious debts
to the sovereign. As discussed below in more detail, however,
creditors should have better incentives than sovereigns or other
actors in determining whether particular debts are odious. Therefore,
the responsibility for designating debts as odious ex post under a
contractual arrangement would ideally be given to the sovereign's
creditors. It is worth noting that the IMF's SDRM proposal
envisioned a similar kind of voting mechanism among creditors. 19
Designing the procedural rules that would enable creditors to
designate odious debt will be a significant practical challenge for such
a contractual approach. This Article does not propose a detailed
solution to this challenge. Generally speaking, a majority or
supermajority of the sovereign's creditors could be given the power to
designate any of the sovereign's obligations as odious. Alternatively,
the parties could agree that creditors representing a dominant
percentage of claims against the sovereign would have this power. In
any event, the voting scheme should not require too great a degree of
unanimity; if so, it will effectively give creditors an incentive to
become uncooperative holdouts.
A contractual odious debt mechanism will face significant but
surmountable enforcement challenges. The parties should agree at
the lending stage that the sovereign will refuse to pay any obligations
identified as odious by a majority of creditors (or any other
decisionmaker chosen by the parties). Thus, creditors would
designate debts as odious and then insist that the sovereign refuse to
honor the odious debt. As noted above, sovereign regimes are
generally hesitant to repudiate their sovereign's obligations.110 This is
especially true where the regime may have acute short-term
interests."' The contractual odious debt arrangement should correct
these incentives because the sovereign's refusal to repudiate will be
an event of default on its existing credit arrangements. Thus, a
sovereign should have a strong incentive to repudiate debt designated
as odious under the arrangement to avoid immediate default on other
obligations. Furthermore, where a responsible regime has succeeded
a repressive one, the new regime should be very receptive to
repudiating existing debt if it thinks it can do so without damaging its
109. See Krueger, supra note 95.
110. See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
111. See Bolton & Skeel, supra note 94, at 770-71.
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reputation or being punished by legitimate creditors and institutional
actors.
Ideally, the contractual arrangement described above would
operate without the need for any judicial intervention. Undoubtedly,
however, some creditors whose obligations are repudiated under the
arrangement will litigate to challenge the treatment of their
obligations. As noted above, creditors have grown increasingly
inclined to litigate claims against their sovereign borrowers.'1 2 Given
the likelihood of such litigation, the parties might actually agree ex
ante that any designation by creditors of a debt as odious could be
reviewed in a domestic court. 3 This would presumably provide a
measure of protection or encouragement for minority creditors, and it
might help persuade hesitant creditors to opt into the arrangement.
There are good reasons to believe, however, that a contractual
odious debt mechanism could minimize the role of judicial
enforcement. The contractual arrangement itself will place a limit on
the ability of creditors to successfully challenge repudiation of their
obligations. A court would assess repudiation under the arrangement
as a question of contract law-whether the creditor assented to the
terms of the arrangement and whether the other creditors performed
in accordance with the terms of the arrangement. If a creditor opts in
to the odious debt scheme, it should not succeed in a lawsuit
challenging the designation of its debts as odious unless there is some
reason to believe that the designation was made arbitrarily. Unless
the debt designated as odious bears no similarity to the contractual
definition, this should be a relatively quick and easy contract dispute.
It will obviously be harder to employ the contractual
arrangement against creditors who did not opt into the arrangement
themselves. As noted above, a sovereign that adopts this contractual
arrangement with some creditors might cheat by borrowing from a
creditor without insisting that the creditor agree to opt into the
arrangement. Such debts may likely turn out to be odious; the
sovereign would presumably not need to cheat to borrow non-odious
debt. In that case, if other creditors designated that obligation as
odious, there are a number of reasons to believe that the arrangement
might still enable the sovereign to repudiate this claim. If such a
creditor sued to challenge the repudiation of its debt, the majority
112. See supra note 61 and accompanying text (discussing the decline of sovereign
immunity and increased litigation by sovereigns' creditors).
113. See, e.g., Bratton & Gulati, supra note 23, at 61-76 (discussing the need to rely on
judicial backstop enforcement of intercreditor duties).
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creditors and the sovereign might be able to argue that the
complaining creditor had notice of the arrangement.1 4  If the
sovereign and the majority creditors could show that the complaining
creditor had notice of the contractual arrangement, they might be
able to imply actual assent to the mechanism." 5
If they cannot enforce the arrangement on grounds of actual
implied assent, the sovereign or its creditors may attempt to employ
one of the odious debt doctrines discussed above-the traditional
odious debt doctrine, for example, or some variant based in domestic
private law. This may seem like a move back to square one in the
odious debt problem, but it is not. Relying on these doctrines on the
back end of an otherwise comprehensive contractual arrangement is
different from relying on them as a primary mechanism. In that
circumstance, a majority of the sovereign's creditors will already have
designated the debt in question as odious and will have insisted that
the sovereign repudiate the debt. It may be easier to succeed under
those doctrines when the sovereign and creditors are acting in good
faith pursuant to a thoughtfully designed, contractual arrangement.
Furthermore, some of the practical dangers of repudiating sovereign
debt should be reduced when it is done against the contractual
backdrop described above. As discussed below in more detail, the
market for sovereign debt will almost surely be disturbed by any
repudiation of debt by a sovereign. It should be less disturbed if the
repudiated debt had first been designated as odious by a majority of
the sovereign's creditors.
B. Transitions
1. Good Regime, Questionable Reputation
Imagine now an existing regime that wants to opt into a
contractual odious debt scheme. This regime wants to incur
obligations that are valuable to its population, but it has a
questionable financial and political history. Due to its shaky
reputation for responsible borrowing, this regime may have difficulty
114. As suggested above, the parties could create some form of recording or notice
scheme for this very purpose. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
115. For a restatement of the principles relating to contractual obligations implied in
fact, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 4 cmt. a. Under these principles, a
contractual term becomes effective if one contracting party knows that its counter-party
intends to agree to that term and the first party does not object. Id. This doctrine would
presumably not apply to situations where sovereigns actually express an intent not to
agree to the term with their creditors.
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convincing creditors of its intention to borrow for the benefit of its
population. The contractual mechanism described above would give
the sovereign an opportunity to commit to avoid incurring odious
obligations. It would also create a contractual mechanism that would
give the sovereign's non-odious creditors the ability to insist that any
odious obligations incurred by the sovereign would be repudiated.
This sovereign presumably has a complicated array of existing
creditors, none of which have made any agreements or
representations regarding odious debt. To opt into a contractual
odious debt arrangement, the sovereign might renegotiate its existing
credit arrangements. Assuming that the odious debt arrangement is
valuable to the creditors and the sovereign,1 6 there should be real
opportunities for efficient refinancing into the scheme." 7 Even if this
sovereign cannot renegotiate with its existing creditors to adopt the
arrangement, it may be able to transition into the scheme through
agreements with future creditors. To do so, it might promise new
creditors that it will attempt to encourage its existing creditors to opt
into the arrangement. As the sovereign persuades any of its new or
existing creditors to adopt the arrangement, then other creditors
should be less and less resistant to the scheme. They will presumably
have more confidence in the sovereign's commitment to borrow funds
that provide value to its citizens. Significantly, by adopting the
agreement, the existing regime will limit the ability of its successor
governments to borrow odious debt. If a subsequent regime attempts
to borrow odious debt, potential creditors will have to lend into the
contractual arrangement.
2. Questionable or Bad Regime
The development of a contractual odious debt-relief mechanism
should also have some impact on a regime that has questionable
purposes for borrowing. Such a sovereign may not seek to adopt the
arrangement itself. If the arrangement becomes common, creditors
will presumably take note of this, taking it as a sign that the sovereign
may intend to borrow odious debt. This may, in turn, cause the
creditors to assign a lower value to the obligation and propose a
higher rate (or require greater up-front payments). A questionable
regime may agree to adopt the odious debt arrangement to avoid this.
116. See infra Part III.C. (proposing that the contractual mechanism will be valuable to
creditors and sovereign borrowers).
117. Some debt holders will likely not be the original creditors, however, and it may be
hard to renegotiate with assignees and purchasers of these obligations. See Buchheit et aL,
supra note 1 (manuscript at 32-33).
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If the regime adopts the arrangement, even as a pretense, it will have
put in place a contractual mechanism for repudiating odious debt in
the future.
A contractual odious debt relief mechanism could have
beneficial effects even on those sovereigns whose leaders have
unquestionably bad motives. Assume the worst-case scenario: a
regime that does not make any attempt to borrow funds for the
benefit of its citizens and does not make any pretense of doing so. It
refuses to make any promises not to incur odious debt. At the very
least, if the contractual mechanism becomes prevalent, that should
make it somewhat harder or more expensive for this regime to get
funds. It is entirely possible, however, that this regime will simply not
care about incurring the higher cost of credit; it is willing to soak the
last drop of value out of its nation before relinquishing power. It is
fair to assume that such a regime will incur a significant amount of
debt that could reasonably be defined as odious.
Once such a regime falls, however, the availability of a
contractual odious debt mechanism will prove beneficial to a
successor regime. The new regime will presumably want to borrow
new funds necessary to recover from the problems left by the
previous regime and it will may want to try to repudiate its existing
odious obligations. A contractual mechanism might help with both of
these goals even if none of the sovereign's existing creditors had
opted into the arrangement. The new regime might be able to
borrow new funds at a lower cost by committing not to incur odious
debt in the future. In many respects, the new regime is in the same
situation as the good regime with an uncertain reputation discussed
above. It may not be able to convince existing creditors to
renegotiate into the contractual scheme, but it could encourage
subsequent creditors to do so. Through its responsible borrowing
going forward, it can develop a good reputation and make its promise
to avoid odious debt credible.
The development of a contractual odious debt relief scheme may
also make it more feasible for this new regime to repudiate its
inherited obligations unilaterally. As discussed above, successor
regimes do not repudiate their obligations due to reputational
concerns or fear of other penalties.11 8  If the successor could
effectively commit to future creditors that it will not incur odious
debt, that regime might be able to mitigate some of the costs of
repudiating its inherited debts. The new regime may, for example, be
118. See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
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able to borrow new funds under the contractual arrangement and
then ask the new, non-odious creditors to designate the existing
obligations as odious. It could then repudiate pre-existing obligations
without suffering a penalty, though not formally pursuant to the
arrangement itself. In this way, sovereigns that throw off truly odious
regimes can transition into a private scheme by effectively leveraging
new non-odious creditors against old odious ones.
3. Summary
To summarize, the contractual mechanism described in this
section is designed to operate as follows. A sovereign and its
creditors will agree at the lending stage that the obligation they create
will be subject to repudiation if it is odious. The sovereign will also
promise each creditor that it will make similar agreements with other
creditors and that if it subsequently incurs odious debt, those
obligations will be subject to repudiation. If the sovereign incurs
odious debt in the future or if it borrows from a creditor who does not
opt into the arrangement, it will breach its agreement with its existing
creditors. These creditors would be given authority under their
agreements with the sovereign to designate debts as odious ex post,
and the sovereign will be committed to repudiate these debts.
Actions taken pursuant to the agreement should withstand judicial
review, which will reduce the chances of litigation. It may be possible
to enforce the agreement against creditors who have notice of the
general arrangement even if they do not formally adopt it. The
availability of this contractual arrangement may embolden sovereigns
with existing odious debts to repudiate those obligations; if those
sovereigns can opt into the arrangement with subsequent creditors
they may be able to avoid some of the costs of unilaterally
repudiating their existing obligations.
C. Embracing Contract
The most significant practical challenge to a contractual odious
debt mechanism will be coordinating the contracting process with the
sovereign and its various debtors. Recent developments in the
sovereign debt market suggest that market participants may be
amenable to a contractual approach to odious debt. After a wave of
sovereign debt restructurings in the last two decades, many market
observers and participants became increasingly interested in
promoting greater use of collective action provisions in sovereign
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bonds. " 9 These provisions, historically common in bonds issued
under English law, allow a majority or supermajority of creditors to
alter important terms of their bonds, including the amount of the
obligation."' 0 Sovereign bonds issued in the United States have, until
recently, not included clauses that authorize a majority or
supermajority of creditors to alter payment dates, amount of
obligations under the bonds, or other significant terms.121  Around
2002 or 2003, the U.S. Department of the Treasury began to advocate
the use of collective action clauses in sovereign debt instruments
issued in the United States.12 2 Treasury and other proponents of such
arrangements argued at the time that they promote efficient
sovereign debt restructuring.1 23 In 2003, Mexico issued bonds under
New York law that included "majority modification" provisions; since
then, nearly all issues under New York law have included these
collective action clauses. 124 This episode reveals, first, that the market
119. See Lee C. Buchheit & G. Mitu Gulati, Sovereign Bonds and the Collective Will, 51
EMORY L.J. 1317, 1333-34 (2002); Gelpern & Gulati, supra note 19 (manuscript at 3).
120. Since the late nineteenth century, corporate and sovereign bonds issued under
English law have included these provisions. Buchheit & Gulati, supra note 119, at 1325
("Majority action clauses are now a regular feature of both corporate and sovereign bonds
governed by the laws of England."); Gelpern & Gulati, supra note 19 (manuscript at 3).
They were adopted in large part to limit the ability of minority creditors to effectively hold
up a debt restructuring process. Buchheit & Gulati, supra note 119, at 1324. The problem
of hold-out creditors in the private context was addressed in the United States first by the
development of equity receiverships and, eventually, by corporate reorganization law
under Chapter 11. See DAVID A. SKEEL, JR., DEBT'S DOMINION 57 (2001).
121. See Buchheit & Gulati, supra note 119, at 1329. As Buchheit and Gulati explain in
detail, the development of such clauses was stymied by concerns about the negotiability of
the debt instruments and, eventually, by the availability of corporate restructuring laws.
Id. at 1326-29. While Congress addressed the restructuring needs of domestic
corporations, however, it did not address the similar needs of sovereign borrowers. Id. at
1330. "A sovereign bond issuer of the early twenty-first century [issued under U.S. law] is
in much the same spot as the distressed corporate or railroad bond issuer of the early
twentieth century." Id. at 1322. That said, bonds issued under United States law
historically allowed some creditor coordination. For example, 75% of creditors have long
had the power to agree to defer the timing of payments for a relatively short period of
time. See id. at 1328. Furthermore, most sovereign bonds have also provided that 25% of
creditors can trigger an acceleration of a sovereign's obligations upon default and that
75% of creditors can reverse such an acceleration. See id. at 1330-31 (noting the value of
such a provision to a sovereign that wants to renegotiate its obligations to creditors).
122. See Bolton & Skeel, supra note 94, at 765; Gelpern & Gulati, supra note 19
(manuscript at 20).
123. Advocates of collective action clauses propose that domestic courts would likely
police restructuring of bond obligations under majority action clauses and would impose
intercreditor duties to protect minority bondholders. See Buchheit & Gulati, supra note
119, at 1337-41. They note that before the creation of Chapter 11, there was a "flowering"
of intercreditor duties to try to address similar hold-out problems. Id. at 1337-38.
124. The exact reasons for this shift are complex and probably hidden from history.
According to Gelpern and Gulati, who interviewed most of the market and official-sector
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for sovereign debt is willing to adopt contractual innovations.
Equally important, it shows that the official sector-in this case, the
U.S. Treasury-can play an instrumental role in prodding market
participants to embrace new contractual approaches. This is
especially true where the benefits are not obvious to the private
actors, or where the innovation might create significant positive
externalities that the parties themselves would not capture. Finally,
this episode may show that market participants are willing to adopt
innovative contractual approaches to forestall more dramatic reforms
or solutions.126
Significant for present purposes, at least some commentators
have proposed that sovereigns and creditors could employ collective
action clauses more broadly. At the height of interest in the IMF's
proposal, Lee Buchheit and Mitu Gulati proposed that sovereigns and
creditors could employ available contractual arrangements to adopt
and enforce a broad restructuring plan.127 Buchheit and Gulati and
other writers have further suggested that sovereigns and their
creditors might be able to create an effective scheme of priorities by
contract through subordination agreements.'28 It has gone largely
underappreciated that important strands of contract theory, especially
contract-based bankruptcy theory, provide theoretical support for this
private, contractual approach to debt restructuring.129  Contract
actors involved in this episode, the shift occurred in part as a result of pressure (often
informal) from officials at the U.S. Treasury. See Gelpern & Gulati, supra note 19
(manuscript at 64); see also id. (manuscript at 12) (noting an earlier shift in this direction
by issuers, including Bulgaria, Kazakhstan, Egypt, Lebanon, and Qatar, that "had no
broader market impact").
125. There is still debate about whether collective action clauses are efficient or
provide any real benefit. See Gelpern & Gulati, supra note 19 (manuscript at 29). In fact,
in recent years, Pakistan, Ukraine, and Ecuador have flinched instead of relying on the
collective action clauses in their bonds and cramming down agreements on minority
creditors. See Buchheit & Gulati, supra note 119, at 1346.
126. See, e.g., Gelpern & Gulati, supra note 19 (manuscript at 17-18) (noting that some
commentators explained the adoption of collective action clauses in bonds issued under
New York law as a product of "fear of SDRM").
127. See Buchheit & Gulati, supra note 119, at 1345-51. Buchheit and Gulati consider
whether it would be necessary to employ some external procedural mechanism/umbrella
like an equitable receivership or a class action through which to conduct this collective
restructuring. Id. at 1352-57.
128. David Skeel, Why Contracts Are Saving Sovereign Bankruptcy, INT'L FIN. L. REV.,
Mar. 2006, at 3, 3; Anna Gelpern, Building a Better Seating Chart for Sovereign
Restructurings, 53 EMORY L.J. 1115, 1119 (2004).
129. This body of scholarship argues that contractual arrangements between firms and
lenders regarding insolvency-state actions should not be prohibited under existing
domestic bankruptcy regimes. Early work in this tradition focused on innovative
mechanisms for determining the value of firms for the purpose of deciding whether they
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theories of bankruptcy question the conventional assumption that a
formal bankruptcy scheme is necessary to solve creditors' collective
action problems.13 ° They provide some support for the proposition
that a borrower and its voluntary creditors can coordinate with each
other to adopt a comprehensive contractual arrangement regarding
debt restructuring.
D. Defining Odiousness
As noted above, a contractual odious debt arrangement should
presumably include a definition of odious debt that the parties agree
will be subject to repudiation. Part of the appeal of a private
contractual solution to odious debt is that it gives this definitional
task to sovereigns and their creditors. This section suggests that
sovereigns and their creditors should define debt as odious if it does
not provide a benefit to the citizens of the sovereign borrower.
Determining when a sovereign and its citizens received value or
benefit from any particular transaction would obviously present a
challenge. This definition should exclude obligations that provide
funds used to finance conventional public goods. Credit provided to
fund projects like highways, dams, hospitals, and schools, etc., should
presumptively not be considered odious. On the opposite end of the
spectrum, credit that simply provides funds for a leader's personal
bank account should presumptively fall within the definition.
Undoubtedly, however, many projects will be difficult to classify
should be reorganized or liquidated. See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird, The Uneasy Case for
Corporate Reorganizations, 15 J. LEGAL STUD. 127 (1986); Douglas G. Baird, A World
Without Bankruptcy, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1987, at 173. This initial round of
scholarship tended to assume, however, that a mandatory bankruptcy procedure was
necessary because firms and their creditors were not able to agree ex ante about how to
resolve claims to the firm's assets if it became insolvent. See, e.g., Baird, The Uneasy Case,
supra, at 130-32. Significantly, however, Baird was one of the first contemporary scholars
to raise the serious question of whether a mandatory bankruptcy regime was likely to
reflect the arrangement that investors and firms would actually choose if the law allowed
them to do so. See id. at 135 & n.12 (arguing that investors cannot reach agreement
themselves, but acknowledging that it is impossible to know this for sure). Interestingly,
bankruptcy scholars who have considered contractual arrangements for sovereign debt
restructuring are decidedly skeptical about the feasibility of doing so. See David A. Skeel,
Can Majority Voting Provisions Do It All?, 52 EMORY L.J. 417, 422-25 (2003); Rasmussen,
supra note 23, at 1162, 1185.
130. See Randal C. Picker, Security Interests, Misbehavior, and Common Pools, 59 U.
CHI. L. REV. 645, 675-79 (1992); Barry E. Adler, Financial and Political Theories of
American Corporate Bankruptcy, 45 STAN. L. REV. 311, 313-15 (1993); Alan Schwartz,
Contracting About Bankruptcy, 13 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 127, 128 (1997) ("Collective action
problems... sometimes yield to contractual solutions.").
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under this scheme.' Consider, for example, the construction of a
vanity palace. On one hand, this enriches the dictator because it
simply provides a personal benefit. But it might provide jobs, and it
might serve the civic function of monuments more generally. The
possibility of corruption also complicates this definitional scheme.132
Given these difficulties in classification, the definition of "benefit"
should be generously construed. Repudiation of debt as odious
should be an exceptional event, and debts should be defined as odious
only if they are clearly not valuable. Assuming that creditors will
prefer a narrow, predictable definition,'33 they will tend to err on the
side of defining odiousness narrowly.
Significantly, the definition should also include an explicit safe
harbor provision based on creditors' efforts to determine the purpose
of the sovereign's borrowing.'34 The definition might provide, for
example, that debts are not odious if a creditor credibly insisted on
accounting at the lending stage, engaged in monitoring thereafter,
and/or structured credit facilities to try to ensure that the funds it
131. For an argument that it may be possible to determine whether and when a
particular loan provided value or benefit to the citizens of a sovereign, see Ben-Shahar &
Gulati, supra note 1 (manuscript at 20-23).
132. The fact that private individuals or government officials derive unauthorized or
unwarranted benefits from a transfer should not in and of itself resolve whether the
transfer is odious or not. Yet corruption might be evidence that there was, in fact, no
benefit or value. Consider the example of a stupid public venture-the bridge to
nowhere-that is rife with corruption and skimming of funds. The relevant question will
be whether the funds borrowed to build the bridge created any benefit or value for the
citizens of the sovereign. The fact that there was corruption associated with the project
might help indicate that the bridge was not intended as a public good to begin with, but it
will not be dispositive. It is possible that corruption and odiousness are only different in
degree, but the difference should be important as a practical matter.
Some writers would largely define odiousness with reference to various proxies
like fraud, corruption, or end-stage timing-factors that might indicate the likelihood that
particular debts are odious. See, e.g., Buchheit et al., supra note 1 (manuscript at 5). In
the case of odious debt, using definitional proxies may result in significant costs of over-
and under-inclusiveness. Procedural proxies such as fraud or corruption will be especially
costly. This problem is likely to be exacerbated the more despotic a regime is; everything
a corrupt country does is likely to seem corrupt. Using corruption as a proxy in this
context will simply ensure that an odious debt mechanism will be unable to distinguish
many odious obligations from non-odious ones. See supra note 131 and accompanying
text. It is also entirely possible for a regime to incur obligations that provide no value
through a noncorrupt process. If an odious debt mechanism cannot designate those loans
as odious, it will be underinclusive.
133. See infra notes 146-51 and accompanying text.
134. Jayachandran, Kremer and Shafter's most recent article makes the same point,
and they develop a due diligence model for resolving odious debt disputes. See
Jayachandran et al., supra note 12, at 18-22.
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extended did in fact benefit the sovereign. 3 ' Such a safe harbor
provision would leverage creditors' ability to serve as effective
monitors. It is generally understood that creditors are often effective
monitors of their borrowers. 3 6 In the context of private borrowers,
they serve important governance functions, and there is reason to
believe that these governance functions increase the value of their
borrowers. Currently, it appears that sovereigns' creditors do not
engage in significant levels of this kind of governance or monitoring,
largely delegating these functions to multilateral institutions. 37
Conditioning safe harbor protection on creditors' monitoring may
motivate them to take advantage of their access to information and to
employ their unique monitoring skills.
To illustrate the foregoing points, imagine the following scenario.
Sovereign A borrows $15 million from three different creditors ($5
million each). The sovereign tells Creditor 1 and Creditor 2 that it
will use the funds to build a state university, but it makes no
representation to Creditor 3 about the use of the funds. Creditor 1
subsequently insists on seeing evidence that the proceeds of its loan
were actually used for building the university, and the sovereign
provides evidence that it spent $8 million on building the university.
It turns out that $7 million subsequently ends up in the Swiss bank
account of the president of the sovereign. Under the definition
proposed above, the $7 million would presumably be designated as
odious. Creditor 3 made no efforts to insist on accounting or
monitoring; it extended $5 million without even inquiring about the
purpose of the loans. It could therefore not show that it deserved safe
135. Defining odious debt in this way might lead to a shift to more project-based
financing and less borrowing for "uncontractable" purposes.
136. For an extended discussion of creditor monitoring and creditor governance, see
Adam Feibelman, Commercial Lending and- the Separation of Banking and Commerce, 75
U. CIN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2007) (manuscript at 10, on file with the North Carolina Law
Review).
137. See generally Gulati & Triantis, supra note 23 (noting that most sovereign bonds
include a provision requiring the sovereign debtor to maintain its IMF eligibility or
membership). It appears that, under the leadership of Paul Wolfowitz, the World Bank
has begun to play a much more aggressive role in monitoring the financial activities of
sovereign regimes. See Ben-Shahar & Gulati, supra note 1 (manuscript at 34) (suggesting
that sovereign debt instruments could require sovereigns to remain in good standing with
the World Bank); Jai Damle, The Odious Debt Doctrine After Iraq, 70 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS (forthcoming 2007) (manuscript at 13-14, on file with the North Carolina Law
Review) (discussing Wolfowitz's plan to make assistance from the World Bank dependant
on anti-corruption policies). But see Gelpern, Odious, Not.Debt, supra note 1 (manuscript
at 9-10) (arguing that some bilateral creditors and especially major-power sovereigns use




harbor treatment. Creditor 1, on the other hand, might deserve safe
harbor treatment because it required accounting ex ante and then
monitored the use of the funds.
Creditor 2 would present a difficult issue. It extended credit
pursuant to the sovereign's representation about legitimate use of
funds, but it did not make any serious effort to confirm that the funds
were actually used for this purpose. Depending on the nature of the
safe harbor protection, there are three ways that this creditor's claim
might be characterized. First, the creditor might not be able to
benefit at all from safe harbor treatment because it made no effort to
confirm that its loan was used for the purpose represented by the
sovereign. In that case, its entire debt would be deemed odious. On
the other hand, the creditor might be able to argue that $3 million of
its loan should not be considered odious because it made some efforts
at the lending stage to lend for non-odious purposes; in other words,
it might be able to claim the balance of non-odious debt after the first
creditor's $5 million is subtracted. Finally, the creditor might get the
full benefit of safe harbor because it made at least some effort to lend
for a legitimate use.
One obvious practical problem with defining odious debt in
relation to the actual use of the funds is that money is fungible.
138
Sovereigns have many creditors and other sources of funds, so it will
be hard to determine how the funds from each creditor are used.
Reconsider the three creditors discussed above; from a bird's-eye
view, each creditor arguably helped finance the university and each
helped pad the personal accounts of the despot. This may present a
fatal challenge to the safe harbor proposal, and it may be impossible
to determine in any case whether the proceeds of a loan provided a
benefit to the sovereign. In many circumstances, however, it will be
possible to trace funds ex post.139 Sophisticated forensic accounting
138. See, e.g., Rajan, supra note 1, at 54.
139. In fact, creditors and courts routinely engage in ex post tracing of proceeds in the
context of secured lending to private borrowers. Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial
Code provides that "a security interest attaches to any identifiable proceeds of collateral."
See U.C.C. § 9-315(a)(2) (2005). Often proceeds will be commingled with other fungible
assets. To deal with this, Article 9 also provides that "proceeds that are commingled with
other property are identifiable proceeds ... if the proceeds are not goods, to the extent
that the secured party identifies the proceeds by a method of tracing .... " See U.C.C. § 9-
315(b)(2). For discussion of tracing proceeds in this context, see, for example, Richard L.
Barnes, Tracing Commingled Proceeds: The Metamorphosis of Equity Principles into
U.C.C. Doctrine, 51 U. PITT. L. REV. 281, 285-306 (1990); Richard L. Barnes, UCC Article
Nine Revised: Priorities, Preferences, and Liens Effective Only in Bankruptcy, 82 NEB. L.
REV. 607, 619 (2004); Harris J. Dia, Note, Tracing Cash Proceeds in Insolvency
Proceedings Under Revised Article 9, 9 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 385, 389-91 (2001).
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investigations can aid in determining whether funds from a loan or
bond issue directly or indirectly helped fund odious or non-odious
uses.14 If enforceability depended on it, parties will have incentives
to disclose or try to discover information that would aid in making
these determinations.
Imagine a variation of the scenario discussed above; this time,
only one creditor, Creditor A, lends $5 million. The sovereign
borrower builds a university for $5 million, and the sovereign leader
ends up with $5 million in his or her Swiss bank account. It may be
possible to demonstrate that the sovereign's obligation to Creditor A
is odious. The fact that the leader received a personal benefit after
the loan may itself be evidence that the proceeds of the loan were
used for this purpose. It may also be possible to establish that the
sovereign's revenues or available assets before the loan would have
been sufficient to fund the university project and that the sovereign
did not experience other accompanying tax reductions or increases in
consumption. These factors might help forensic accountants establish
that the proceeds of the loan made possible the personal benefit of
the leader.141 If Creditor A made no effort to avoid this misuse of its
Granted, this context is different than the use of proceeds of a loan, but the experience of
secured creditors in tracing this financial information suggests that many creditors have
sophisticated abilities to gather and evaluate this kind of accounting information.
140. Forensic accounting has become a significant area of expertise in recent decades.
Experts in this field have become essential components of litigation strategy in areas such
as divorce, antitrust, government corruption, and corporate fraud. For discussion of the
growing importance and sophistication of forensic accounting, see Michael J. Bazyler,
WWW.SWISSBANKCLAIMS.COM: The Legality and Morality of the Holocaust-Era
Settlement with the Swiss Banks, 25 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 64, 76 n.27 (2001); Lyman P.Q.
Johnson, The Audit Committee's Ethical and Legal Responsibilities: The State Law
Perspective, 47 S. TEX. L. REV. 27, 53 (2005); Steven V. Melnik, The Inadequate Utilization
of the Accounting Profession in the United States Government's Fight Against Money
Laundering, 4 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 143, 155-56 (2000); Philippa Webb, The
United Nations Convention Against Corruption: Global Achievement or Missed
Opportunity?, 8 J. INT'L ECON. L. 191, 210-11 (2005); Molly L. Zohn, How Antitrust
Damages Measure Up with Respect to the Daubert Factors, 13 GEO. MASON L. REV. 697,
733 (2005).
141. It may often be easier to trace the use of trade credit. It would be fairly clear, for
example, that a supplier of mustard gas on credit helped finance the gassing of dissident
populations by the sovereign's military. Suppliers of chicken farm equipment on credit, by
contrast, probably did not help finance similar abuses. Admittedly, some trade credit will
be harder to categorize. For example, it may be harder to determine whether claims of
suppliers of conventional military weapons should be subject to repudiation if the regime
uses those types of weapons against its own citizens. In such cases, the mechanism might
rely on the same type of tracing principles described above, and it might rely on the same
type of safe harbor protections as well. If so, it would be necessary to determine what the
creditor knew about the intended use of the supplies and whether it took other
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funds, then it would not enjoy safe harbor, and its debt may be
repudiated by a subsequent regime at the direction of the sovereign's
non-odious creditors. A creditor could try to avoid this result by
insisting that the funds it transfers to the sovereign be segregated
from general funds and dedicated to particular uses.
III. ADVANTAGES OF A CONTRACTUAL APPROACH
The foregoing Part explained that a contractual approach to
odious debt is practicable. This Part argues that it should also be
desirable. A contractual approach is likely to serve the normative
goals of odious debt relief better than the alternative proposals
discussed above.
A. Odious Debt Goals
Any mechanism designed to enable sovereigns to repudiate
odious debt would have two primary and interrelated goals. First,
most obviously, it would expand the ability of sovereign governments
to obtain debt relief ex post. A sovereign would gain the ability to
improve its financial position by repudiating obligations incurred for
unproductive or odious purposes. This is especially valuable for
sovereigns that are carrying an unsustainable debt load. Reducing
"debt overhang" helps sovereigns fund public goods and promote
development.14 2  The mechanism would presumably benefit a
sovereign that owes potentially odious debt, even if its does not
decide to employ the mechanism. As suggested above, if a sovereign
can make a credible threat to repudiate its obligations, it should gain
some advantage in attempting to negotiate for debt restructuring.
143
opportunities to monitor the use of the supplies and perhaps condition its own continuing
performance thereupon.
142. See supra note 25 and accompanying text. An odious debt relief mechanism
should also prove beneficial to sovereigns that have sustainable levels of debt. In theory,
discharging any debt that did not add value to the sovereign should be efficient. Such
debts simply add to the financial obligations of the current government. They inefficiently
inflate the tax burden of its citizens by requiring tax increases to fund the same amount of
public goods or by decreasing the sovereign's consumption and provision of public goods.
Furthermore, because of the need to devote tax revenues or national resources to repay
these obligations, the overall value of the sovereign's outstanding debt will presumably
decline. The sovereign will have to pay a higher rate for any additional credit it needs, if it
can obtain any. If a sovereign is able to repudiate such obligations, the value of the
sovereign's other (presumably non-odious) outstanding debts should increase, and its cost
of borrowing should decline.
143. See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text (discussing the possibility that Iraq
and Nigeria may have prodded creditors into voluntary restructuring by implicitly
threatening to repudiate debts as odious).
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
This benefit of ex post debt relief is not costless. Sovereigns
must make sure that they do not undermine the confidence of
creditors. Thus, if sovereigns are going to entertain the possibility of
repudiating their obligations, they will need to be able to assure
creditors that they will not do so arbitrarily. The grounds of
repudiation should be as clear and predictable as possible so that
creditors can lend to sovereigns and avoid the conditions of
repudiation. Otherwise, creditors may simply stop lending to
sovereigns or they may charge sovereigns a very high rate,
outweighing any benefit of the debt relief.
The second and perhaps more important goal of an odious debt
mechanism is to affect the behavior of sovereign regimes (and their
creditors) ex ante, at the lending stage."' If odious debt is subject to
discharge, repudiation, or subordination, then the cost of borrowing
potentially odious debt should increase. If so, it should become
harder, or more expensive, for despotic regimes to incur such debts,
creating a disciplining force against such regimes.145 Ideally, this
should promote improved governance and reduce the chances that a
regime will engage in abuses against its own population.
B. A Normative Critique of Existing Proposals
Assuming that any of the proposed odious debt doctrines or
institutions can overcome the various formal and political threshold
challenges outlined above in Part I, these proposals are still probably
not well designed to achieve the primary goals of odious debt relief.
Most of these proposals are not likely to develop a consistent
practical definition of odious debt. Consider the traditional doctrine
itself, for example. The fact that the doctrine has not been
unambiguously employed over the last century or so means that there
are no clean precedents defining the scope of the doctrine in
practice. t46 In proposing to apply the doctrine to the Iraq context,
commentators have had to refer back to the broad definition of the
doctrine as articulated by Sack nearly a century ago. If the odious
144. See Paulus, supra note 1, at 87-88; Kremer & Jayachandran, supra note 1, at 90-
91.
145. Various factors may undermine this disciplinary effect. If sovereigns have
relatively easy access to tax revenue or national resources, for example, their demand for
credit may not respond to the cost of credit as directly as would be true of a borrower with
more constraints.
146. As Anna Gelpern notes of the traditional doctrine, "in its current state [the
doctrine] offers no meaningful guidance to shape decisions on lending to the emerging




debt doctrine were to be applied today, a decisionmaker would
essentially have to paint on a blank canvas. 147 Given the importance
of clarity and predictability for any mechanism for repudiating
sovereign debt, this uncertainty is troubling. Employing doctrines
drawn from domestic private law would lead to similar problems.
Because courts would not be painting on a blank canvas with such
doctrines, however, they might be able to apply them somewhat less
erratically and more predictably.
Any potential uncertainty and unpredictability associated with
these doctrines are compounded by the fact that they represent an
inherently ad hoc approach to odious debt questions. 148 It is doubtful
whether courts will be able to apply any standard of odiousness
consistently and predictably. Courts are inclined to focus heavily on
the cases before them and to resolve legal issues in light of case-
specific factors.1 49  Under such circumstances, courts of general
jurisdiction are unlikely to develop useful expertise or a coherent
doctrine of odious debt over time. And significantly, these courts will
probably not have to bear any significant costs of choosing a
suboptimal definition of odiousness or of applying the definition
unpredictably. Thus, there is no reason to believe that they will have
good incentives to avoid unsettling financial markets.15
By comparison, an odious debt claims tribunal like the one
described in Part I would probably be more likely to develop some
expertise in sovereign debt claims because that would be its exclusive
purpose. At least with respect to the particular set of claims within
the tribunal's jurisdiction, the arbitrators of each tribunal will also
have the ability to develop a relatively clear standard for odiousness
and to apply the standard consistently. They may also have incentives
do so. The success of such a tribunal would largely depend on its
perceived legitimacy and usefulness. Arbitrators would presumably
be invested in the success of the tribunal and would therefore have an
incentive to reach decisions that were perceived as well-reasoned and
consistent. A tribunal created by broad political agreement between
official and private creditors and the Iraqi regime may also enjoy
147. See supra Part I.A.
148. See Paulus, supra note 1, at 91-92.
149. For a similar argument in a different context, see Adam Feibelman, Federal
Bankruptcy Law and State Sovereign Immunity, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1381, 1405 (2003).
150. There are similar problems with an approach that would rely on bringing claims
before the International Court of Justice. See supra note 71. Such a court is unlikely to
develop any expertise in these types of disputes and is unlikely to have strong institutional
incentives to efficiently discharge or subordinate sovereign obligations.
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more institutional confidence than, say, domestic courts in
designating particular debts for repudiation.
Nonetheless, an odious debt claim tribunal will likely face similar
definitional problems as those discussed above. Such an approach is
arguably more ad hoc than any of the doctrinal approaches.
Decisions made by one tribunal might provide a useful guide as
standards or rules regarding odious debt, but these decisions would
have no formal precedential value for future disputes involving other
sovereigns. Each tribunal might look to cases from previous tribunals
or from elsewhere as persuasive authority, but none would have an
incentive to carefully develop a coherent and predictable doctrine
over time. Since each tribunal would have a life of one generation,
there is no reason to believe that the concerns of a country-specific
tribunal would extend beyond its particular domain. For these
reasons, a tribunal might have weak incentives to try to be sensitive to
the effects that its actions may have on financial markets generally or
on other sovereign borrowers.
The odious debt institution proposed by Kremer and
Jayachandran may generate a more predictable, uniform approach to
odious debt. The consequences of a designation would be so great
that the tribunal would be under significant pressure to be clear and
consistent in its application. Because it would be an ongoing
institution with responsibility to make odious debt determinations
over time, it would also be in a relatively good position to act in a
predictable and coherent manner. It should have more of an
incentive to do so, as the legitimacy of'such an institution would
largely be a function of its consistency in making principled decisions
about odiousness over time. A potentially significant problem with
the scheme, however, is that it is necessarily an unforgiving binary
scheme. If a regime is actually designated odious, it will likely face
the equivalent of a loan or aid embargo. 5' Embargoes are not
uncommon in international affairs, but the kind of embargo
envisioned by Kremer and Jayachandran would likely be harsher than
most. While such an embargo should have some beneficial effects on
the incentives of odious regimes, it may be tougher medicine than the
world community wants to employ, even against despots.'52 Given
151. See Kremer & Jayachandran, supra note 1, at 87-89.
152. See Gelpern, Iraq and Argentina, supra note 1, at 413 ("[T]he aid penalty seems
excessive and impractical .... ); Buchheit et al., supra note 1 (manuscript at 26 n.85)
(citing David A. Baldwin, Reconciling Political Sanctions with Globalization and Free
Trade: Prologamena to Thinking About Economic Sanctions and Free Trade, 4 CHI. J.
INT'L L. 271 (2003)); Justin D. Stalls, Economic Sanctions, 11 U. MIAMI INT'L. & COMP. L.
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these stakes, such a tribunal would likely-as a practical matter-
hesitate to designate a regime as odious until it had become
egregiously bad. There is a significant risk that it would not be willing
to do so at all. Perhaps for these reasons, these authors have
proposed an alternative approach, one that would enable creditors to
lend to regimes designated as odious so long as the creditors make
efforts to confirm that the credit is used for non-odious purposes.'53
Such a change may mitigate the dramatic effects of being designated
as odious, but it seems likely that the designation would still be
extremely disruptive.
It is quite possible that a formal sovereign bankruptcy procedure
would provide a better mechanism for addressing odious debt than
the other options discussed above. A bankruptcy administrator or
decisionmaker with experience in sovereign debt matters would have
significant advantages over a general domestic court, the
International Court of Justice, or an international tribunal in
addressing odious debt claims. Such an actor would likely be more
familiar with the substance and scope of sovereigns' credit
relationships than other courts or tribunals. Like the IMF and other
financial institutions in the international public sector, it would
presumably develop a relatively sophisticated understanding of the
ongoing financial concerns of sovereigns as well as their creditors.
Perhaps more important, individuals associated with a formal
sovereign bankruptcy institution should have good incentives to try to
develop an efficient approach to odious debt. Like the tribunal
proposed by Kremer and Jayachandran, an ongoing sovereign
bankruptcy institution would internalize some of the costs of
suboptimal repudiation of odious debt. Its ongoing legitimacy would
presumably be directly related to its success in balancing the goal of
odious debt relief with the concerns of financial markets.
Similarly, a sovereign bankruptcy-type court or tribunal would
also be able to eliminate some of the tensions between odious debt
claims and general debt restructuring. The other proposals discussed
above are quite weak in this regard. An ad hoc odious debt
mechanism is most unlikely to promote quick, comprehensive
restructuring of a sovereign's various debts and may even delay a
sovereign's ability to obtain emergency interim financing. A tribunal
REV. 115, 157 (2003); Kremer & Jayachandran, supra note 1, at 87 (discussing how
sanctions can have injurious effects on the population of the sovereign targeted by them);
Michael Wines, When Doing Good Also Aides the Devil, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 25, 2005, § 4, at
5.
153. See Jayachandran et al., supra note 12 (manuscript at 18-19).
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or a court of general jurisdiction may have weak incentives to
proceed as expeditiously as possible when a sovereign has immediate
needs for restructuring.1 14  By contrast, where a sovereign has
potential odious debt claims and a general need for restructuring, a
sovereign bankruptcy process could resolve both issues
simultaneously and in a comprehensive manner. A bankruptcy
decisionmaker might be able to convince creditors to agree to a
restructuring of non-odious debts if odious debts are repudiated or
subordinated. As noted above, however, it does not appear that a
sovereign bankruptcy regime is likely to emerge as an available
alternative in the near future.
C. Why Contract Is Better
A contractual odious debt arrangement may be preferable to the
available alternative mechanisms discussed above. A crucial premise
of the contractual approach is that both a sovereign and its creditors
should have incentives to adopt such an arrangement in the first
place. As suggested above, a sovereign will have two primary
incentives to agree to a provision for repudiation of odious debt.
First, and most obviously, doing so may improve the chances that the
sovereign will derive a benefit ex post in the form of debt relief if it
incurs odious debt. Second, to the extent that such an arrangement
successfully segments the market for sovereign debt, it may lower the
cost of non-odious debt to sovereigns that can credibly commit to
avoid incurring odious debt.
Perhaps more significantly, bona fide creditors of a sovereign
should also have incentives to opt in to the arrangement. Recall that
odious debt does not benefit the sovereign debtor or the citizens of
the sovereign. Presumably, a creditor who is lending non-odious debt
to a sovereign does not want its debtor to incur other obligations that
provide no value to the sovereign. Such obligations represent
competing claims to the sovereign's assets without improving the
financial strength of the sovereign. At least in theory they will
decrease the value of the creditor's claim. Furthermore, such credit
may enable the sovereign to engage in destructive or wasteful
behavior that more directly reduces the value of a creditor's existing
claim. It may also help entrench regimes that do not care much about
the welfare of their citizens or the sustainability of the sovereign's
154. In fact, the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal "took decades to sift through each claim




debt load. These factors suggest that creditors will internalize many
of the benefits of an odious debt relief mechanism if it reduces the
amount of odious debt that sovereigns incur or repay.
There is some evidence that creditors do have such concerns
about the behavior of their sovereign debtors. As noted above,
sovereign bonds generally include provisions requiring sovereigns to
maintain good standing with the IMF.155 This practice may be a way
for creditors to delegate monitoring functions to this institution.156
Furthermore, there is evidence that legitimate creditors are
increasingly motivated to challenge claims of competing creditors
who have acted inequitably. Consider the recent case of Kensington
International, Ltd. v. BNP Paribas, S.A.' 57 In that case, Kensington, a
creditor to the Republic of Congo, sued BNP Paribas, alleging that
the French bank had helped the Congolese government hide assets
from which BNP Paribas itself had apparently been repaid. The case
suggests that bona fide creditors have incentives to help police other
creditors who act inequitably.
Yet creditors will also internalize some of the costs of any
mechanism that allows sovereigns to discharge odious debts. Perhaps
most obviously, they will be subject to direct operation of the
mechanism; they will run the risk that their sovereign debtors will
repudiate debts owed to them pursuant to the mechanism. Non-
odious creditors will also bear costs created by the application of the
mechanism against other creditors. There is a danger under a
contractual scheme, for example, that a majority of creditors might
try to oppress minority creditors by arbitrarily or unfairly
characterizing their debts as odious. If they do, however, they would
likely end up damaging their own interests in lending to financially
viable sovereigns in the future. As noted above, if an odious debt
mechanism were overenforced, it would be more difficult or more
costly for sovereigns to secure valuable financing in general.158 This
would not only hurt sovereigns who want to secure value-enhancing
debts going forward; it would also hurt creditors of those sovereigns.
Non-odious creditors will have a stake in enabling their sovereign
debtor to establish other non-odious credit relationships (especially
155. See Gulati & Triantis, supra note 23 (manuscript at 27).
156. See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
157. Kensington Int'l, Ltd. v. BNP Paribas, S.A., No. 03602569 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 24,
2005) (unpublished opinion, on file with the North Carolina Law Review). The case was
dismissed on procedural grounds, and it is not clear if Kensington is still pursuing the
litigation.
158. See supra Part III.A and accompanying text.
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trade credit and/or transitional financing). Consider what would
happen if trade creditors began to fear that their obligations will be
arbitrarily repudiated. They would become more hesitant to extend
credit to a sovereign, and the cost of trade credit would increase
accordingly. If the sovereign has trouble securing trade credit or
other valuable forms of credit going forward, or if it must pay
considerably more for these facilities, then it may be more likely to
experience some form of financial distress, compromising its existing
obligations. Finally, some creditors will be repeat players and may be
subject to reputational sanctions for aggressive, abusive behavior.
Thus, for example, a sovereign may be reluctant to borrow from a
creditor who develops a bad reputation for treating other creditors
badly.
Thus, while non-odious creditors have an interest in ensuring
that odious debts are identified and repudiated, they also have a
strong interest in ensuring that any odious debt mechanism not be
overly aggressive in discharging sovereign obligations. This suggests
that the interests of these creditors are aligned in important respects
with those of the citizens of their sovereign debtors. Both have a real
interest in making sure the sovereign only incurs obligations that
provide value to the nation itself. When a sovereign incurs odious
debt, the burden is borne by citizens to the extent that they must
ultimately help pay off the obligation, an obligation from which they
derive no benefit. The burden is borne by non-odious creditors to the
extent that they face a somewhat higher risk of actual default, suffer a
more immediate loss in the value of their obligations, or share a
smaller pie in the case of debt restructuring. Both would prefer that
the sovereign repudiate any odious debts it incurs, and yet both have
a significant, ongoing stake in wanting to protect the financial
reputation of the sovereign. This is not to say that these interests are
perfectly aligned. Creditors may prefer that their sovereign borrower
not pursue costly or risky policies designed to benefit the welfare of
their population. It is theoretically possible that a majority of a
sovereign's creditors could vote under a contractual mechanism to
designate as odious obligations incurred to promote these policies.
They might be restrained from taking such action, however, by
reputational or direct financial costs of doing so.159 Furthermore, such
actions might not withstand judicial review if the debts designated as
odious did not conform to the contractual definition. 160
159. See supra Part III.C.
160. See supra notes 113-14 and accompanying text.
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A contractual odious debt relief arrangement also has
advantages at the enforcement stage, when regimes may want to balk
from repudiating or restructuring their sovereign's debt.16' As noted
above, under a contractual approach, the sovereign will have strong
incentives to abide by the terms of its odious debt agreement. If a
debt is designated as odious, it is because a majority or supermajority
of the sovereign's creditors deemed it to be so. There is good reason
to believe that the sovereign would be penalized for breaching the
agreement by paying the debt, an event of default. These costs will
provide at least some disciplining force on sovereign regimes.
Furthermore, repudiating odious debts under the arrangement will
give current and subsequent creditors more confidence that the
sovereign will not incur odious debts in the future. This would likely
improve the creditworthiness of the sovereign to some extent.
Finally, if the sovereign is experiencing financial crisis and is seeking
general debt restructuring, its creditors may have some significant
leverage-they can condition debt relief on a commitment from the
sovereign to repudiate the odious debts. In such a case, the creditors
might agree to provide necessary emergency or interim financing and
to condition this credit on enforcing the odious debt mechanism. 162
CONCLUSION
The contractual mechanism proposed in this Article is designed
to provide a measure of debt relief and to improve the ex ante
incentives of sovereigns and their creditors. It is not designed to
create strong prohibitions or to ensure that sovereigns will not incur
odious debt. Some creditors and some sovereigns will almost
certainly continue to create odious debt in the face of this or any
other odious debt mechanism. A despot who is genuinely
unconcerned about the welfare of his or her citizens will have little
incentive to reduce the sovereign's cost of credit. 163 Creditors who are
willing to lend to such a regime will continue to do so, and they may
161. Bolton & Skeel, supra note 94, at 770-71.
162. This also reflects that a contractual odious debt mechanism would be less
disruptive for sovereigns needing general debt restructuring. The operation of the
mechanism would basically involve the same parties that would need to negotiate a
general debt restructuring. It would be entirely possible to make odious debt
determinations in the course of those negotiations.
163. Furthermore, a despot who is determined to obtain private benefits can
appropriate wealth in other ways than siphoning off borrowed funds. See Rajan, supra
note 1, at 55.
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devise ways to make these transactions profitable, requiring
kickbacks or insisting on an immediate exchange of value."6
That said, a contractual odious debt mechanism should have
some real force to restrain these kinds of transactions. By leveraging
the interests and the monitoring skills of creditors, a contractual
approach may be more effective than alternative mechanisms at
reducing the amount of odious debt outstanding. The contractual
mechanism should significantly increase the cost of odious
transactions by increasing the chance that these obligations will
actually be repudiated. Even reckless or ruthless creditors may be
less willing to extend odious debts and more likely to demand higher
return for potentially odious debts, thereby shrinking the credit
available to regimes inclined to incur such debt. Furthermore, it will
leverage the power of creditors to affect the behavior of sovereign
governments, perhaps prompting more transparent accounting and
monitoring. Even modest success at reducing the amount of odious
debt outstanding should significantly improve the welfare of citizens
of sovereign debtors across the globe.
If a contractual solution to the odious debt problem would
promote the interests of creditors and sovereigns and is otherwise
preferable to proposed alternatives, it is fair to ask why these parties
do not already make such private arrangements. In truth, this is
puzzling, and it might indicate that there are serious obstacles to
contracting around odious debt that are not immediately obvious. On
the other hand, it may be due in part to path dependency. As a
general matter, contractual innovation comes slowly and uncertainly
to sovereign debt markets.165 Thus, it is not implausible to believe
that sovereigns and their creditors have failed to adopt an efficient
contractual arrangement. This is especially true if the overall
efficiency of the arrangement is a product of positive externalities. It
may be, for example, that the citizens of various sovereigns would
benefit significantly from this contractual innovation (if it reduces the
amount of odious debt they must repay, for example) while the
parties themselves receive only modest benefits. If that is the case,
the official sector could play an important role in encouraging parties
to adopt a contractual approach to the odious debt problem.
164. See, e.g., Feinerman, supra note 1 (manuscript at 13-14) (suggesting that making
odious sovereign loans was good business for lenders in the 1970s).
165. See generally Gelpern & Gulati, supra note 19 (exploring the complex and
somewhat mysterious factors leading to adoption of collective action clauses in sovereign
bonds issued under New York law).
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